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This dissertation comprises three chapters. The first chapter motivates the
use of a novel data set combining survey and administrative sources for the study of
internal labor migration. By following a sample of individuals from the American
Community Survey (ACS) across their employment outcomes over time according
to the Longitudinal Employer-Household Dynamics (LEHD) database, I construct
a measure of geographic labor mobility that allows me to exploit information about
individuals prior to their move. This enables me to explore aspects of the migration
decision, such as homeownership and employment status, in ways that have not
previously been possible. In the second chapter, I use this data set to test the the-
ory that falling home prices affect a worker’s propensity to take a job in a different
metropolitan area from where he is currently located. Employing a within-CBSA
and time estimation that compares homeowners to renters in their propensities to
relocate for jobs, I find that homeowners who have experienced declines in the nom-
inal value of their homes are approximately 12% less likely than average to take a
new job in a location outside of the metropolitan area where they currently reside.
This evidence is consistent with the hypothesis that housing lock-in has contributed
to the decline in labor mobility of homeowners during the recent housing bust. The
third chapter focuses on a sample of unemployed workers in the same data set, in
order to compare the unemployment durations of those who find subsequent employ-
ment by relocating to a new metropolitan area, versus those who find employment
in their original location. Using an instrumental variables strategy to address the
endogeneity of the migration decision, I find that out-migrating for a new job signif-
icantly reduces the time to re-employment. These results stand in contrast to OLS
estimates, which suggest that those who move have longer unemployment durations.
This implies that those who migrate for jobs in the data may be particularly dis-
advantaged in their ability to find employment, and thus have strong short-term
incentives to relocate.
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Chapter 1: The Potential for Using Combined Survey and Adminis-
trative Data Sources to Study Internal Labor Migration
1.1 Introduction
The idea of America as a land of opportunity has long been associated with the
vision of people moving freely across the country in order to seek a better fortune.
While international comparisons are difficult, the U.S. population has generally
been considered to have one of the highest mobility propensities in the world, which
has been viewed as a hallmark strength of the labor market (Long, 1991). This
depiction belies the fact, however, that migration has been experiencing a secular
decline for the past 35 years or so, as well as a precipitate decline during the Great
Recession, leading to much research into the causes (Molloy, Smith, and Wozniak,
2011). Two leading culprits are the labor market, which has also been demonstrating
a secular decline in other types of worker transitions, and the housing market, which
suffered a historic collapse following the price bubble of the mid-2000s. The inability
of the unemployed to relocate has been a particular source of concern, since this
group lacks the resources to withstand falling property values, and may also suffer
disproportionately from being unable to move away from distressed areas with high
jobless rates.
Research on these topics has typically been conducted using surveys such as
the Decennial Census and the Current Population Survey (CPS), or administrative
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data from income tax records provided by the Internal Revenue Service (IRS). In
the studies that follow, I create a novel data set that combines survey data from
the American Community Survey (ACS), with administrative data on employment
outcomes from the Longitudinal Employment-Household Dynamics (LEHD) data
base, both created by the U.S. Census Bureau. With this novel data set I am
able to address a couple of questions in the migration literature whose study has
suffered from certain data limitations. First, I test the much discussed theory that
the crash in the housing market contributed to the decline in migration, by leaving
homeowners with insufficient home equity to sell their houses and move. Secondly,
I address whether the recent decline in migration should truly be a concern for
the efficiency of the labor market, by testing whether changing labor markets has a
positive impact on the job prospects of the unemployed, a group for whom migration
is posited to be an important means by which to escape joblessness.
Combining survey data with administrative records in this way allows me to
leverage the strengths of each data source, and in turn compensate for the short-
comings of the other. Survey data, with a rich set of information about individuals,
provides the variables necessary to address a myriad of economic topics of inter-
est. However, due to the financial and logistical constraints of conducting surveys,
these data sets seldomly record the same entities longitudinally, and thus deny the
researcher the ability study the future outcomes in which they may be interested.
The longitudinal surveys that exist, such as the Survey of Income and Program Par-
ticipation (SIPP) and National Longitudinal Surveys (NLS), have relatively small
sample sizes that often do not afford the econometrician sufficient statistical pre-
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cision to test their hypotheses. Administrative records, on the other hand, are
more narrow in focus and lack the detailed information about the economic agents.
However, because these data are recorded routinely and as a matter of course for
the administration of large programs or efforts, they typically have a more compre-
hensive scope spanning multiple years, often observing the same individuals on a
repeated basis.
This type of data proves particularly beneficial in researching migration, an
economic outcome that lends itself to longitudinal study. Existing surveys that do
include a longitudinal component, such as the CPS, do not follow an individual after
they leave their residence, thus it is not possible to determine where the individual
moved to. The CPS, ACS, and Decennial Census all include retrospective measures
of migration, asking a respondent whether they moved in the past year, or 5 years.
While this provides a measure of migration, it does not provide any information
about the respondent’s situation during the time preceding and during their move.
While obviously some characteristics of an individual are consistent over time, like
their sex, race, and date of birth, many others could well have changed. For exam-
ple, when it comes to homeownership, it is not an obvious assumption that someone
who is currently observed owning or renting did the same prior to being surveyed.
Likewise, it is not possible to know from these surveys what an individual’s employ-
ment status was in their prior location. The LEHD data, on the other hand, is an
administrative database that allows researchers to track individuals at different jobs
in different locations over time, but lacks much other information about the worker
and their household. Clearly, a great potential exists for bringing these two types
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of of data together, in order to combine the unique details of a survey with a means
of observing subsequent labor migration via the administrative records.
In this first introductory chapter, I discuss the data sets that typically have
been used to study migration, and motivate how my newly created data set can
address some shortcomings in the previous literature. I also present some basic
measures of migration from this data set, in order to compare them to the statistics
derived from existing sources. Next, the main analytical chapter will describe the
construction of the new data set in greater detail, and show how it can be employed
in testing the hypothesis that declining house prices and negative equity lead to
lower mobility propensities of homeowners. Results from the analysis reveal that
workers are significantly less likely to be observed relocating if they have experienced
a nominal price decline since purchasing their home, although the impact on the
unemployed appears to be somewhat mitigated. In the final chapter, I address the
question of whether or not we should truly be concerned about the recent decline in
migration, by testing whether the unemployed who migrate for their next job have
shorter unemployment spells than they would have by remaining in their original
location. In contrast to previous findings, results which control for selection into
migration show that workers who move for new employment are more likely to be
employed in a shorter timespan than had they stayed in the same location, despite
the fact that their unemployment spells are somewhat longer on average. This may
imply that those who decide to move are the most disadvantaged workers, and thus
may stand the most to gain from relocating.
The rest of the current chapter proceeds as follows. Section 2 discusses the
4
data sets that are typically employed in the literature on internal migration, and
introduces the idea behind the construction of my combined survey/administrative
database. Section 3 discusses the broad topics in migration that the data have
been applied to, and discusses how my new data set can help address some of
the shortcomings in the exisiting literature. Section 4 discusses how migration is
typically measured, and provides comparisons between statistics derived from my
new data set with those from other sources. Section 5 concludes.
1.2 Data Sets Used to Study Migration
Researchers have principally used three data sets to obtain precise, nationally-
representative measures of migration in the United States: the Decennial Census,
and more recently its annual supplement, the ACS; the Annual Social and Economic
Supplement (ASEC) of the CPS; and the IRS origin-destination data.
The decennial census has provided information on migration status since 1940,
asking respondents whether they lived in the same residence 5 years prior, and if
not, what state they lived in at that time. This question began asking the county
of previous residence starting in 1980. The ACS, which began in a beta version in
2000 and full scale starting in 2005, provides the same information as the census but
on an annual frequency. As of 2010, the ACS migration question has supplanted
the one on the decennial census, as the ACS was designed to eliminate the need
for the decennial “long-form”. The census and ACS also provide a way to measure
long-term migration, as well as return migration, by providing the individual’s state
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of birth. These data provide a rich details about an individual’s demographics, em-
ployment status, income, and household conditions, but do not have a longitudinal
component aside from the retrospective migration question. Decennial censuses can
be linked using the confidential microdata, but the ten-year gap between observa-
tions is problematic for many research questions. As the ACS is a cross-sectional
sampling of approximately 5 million respondents, repeated sampling of the same
individual is rare.
The CPS microdata has contained a migration variable in its ASEC supple-
ment since 1965, although migration rates have been published using the CPS going
back to 1948. The CPS contains essentially the same information as the ACS, ask-
ing respondents where they lived in the previous year, down to the county level.
The CPS is the most detailed of the Census-based surveys with a host of informa-
tion about employment, income, health insurance and employer benefits. However,
the CPS has a relatively small sample size, interviewing only about 100,000 house-
holds annually compared to 3 million in the ACS, rendering it less suitable for more
granular measurements and data-intensive analyses. Also, while respondents in the
CPS are interviewed multiple times, those who leave their residence during the in-
terview window are not followed to their destination, thus preventing detection of
subsequent migration. Nevertheless, some studies have used the fact of premature
departure from the sample as a measure of residential mobility.
The IRS origin-destination migration statistics have been released since 1975,
providing measures of county-to-county and state-to-state population flows. These
data are derived from individual tax returns, which provide the address of primary
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residence for each household. Migration is defined as a year-to-year change in the
location of primary residence, weighted by the number of people in each house-
hold according to the number of exemptions claimed on the return. The published
statistics provide counts and rates of gross and net migration between all county
pairs, making it the most comprehensive measure of household mobility. While it is
not known whether tax filers are substantially different than non-tax filers in their
migration propensities, it is estimated that approximately 90% of the population is
covered. Being an administrative database, however, the IRS data does not include
any of the detailed characteristics available in surveys. The confidential microdata
that is available for purchase allows researchers to observe the income figures on the
de-identified returns, but no further information about the individual or household
is available.
A small number of longitudinal surveys exist that allow the user to observe
individuals in their original location and conditions prior to migrating, as well as in
their destination state. The National Longitudinal Survey of Youth 1979 (NLSY79)
and Survey of Income and Program Participation (SIPP) are the two surveys that
have been used the most for this purpose. While nationally representative, these
surveys are limited due to their small sample sizes (under 50,000 survey units), which
make detailed analyses and regression estimates less precise. Nevertheless, several
studies have employed these data in the study of topics such as return migration,
for example DaVanzo (1983), who found that over 25% of migrators are returning
to places they had previously lived.
The new data set that I construct for my analyses combines many of the
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features of the survey and administrative sources described above, thus leveraging
the strengths of each. Using the ACS as my sample population, I am able to take
advantage of its large size and rich information about the individuals and house-
holds. By linking in information on subsequent employment from the LEHD jobs
database, which covers over 95% of private employment in participating states, this
allows near-comprehensive detection of future jobs across the nation, thus provid-
ing a measure of labor migration. This approach has several advantages over using
either the ACS or the LEHD database alone. First, by recording things about the
individual in their original location prior to moving, the data enable the researcher
to more accurately account for the factors that enter into the migration decision.
This is particularly important for the two topics that I address in this dissertation,
namely homeownership and unemployment status, which clearly may vary across
the origin and destination states. Secondly, it provides a direct measurement of
labor mobility, in contrast to other sources that measure household mobility. After
all, in terms of understanding the effect of migration on the labor market, we are
most concerned about whether workers are able to efficiently match with firms lo-
cated in other areas, regardless of whether a change in residences actually occurs.
Also, it permits a more flexible definition of migration in terms of timing thresholds,
especially due to the quarterly nature of the LEHD data. Instead of being bound by
the ACS or IRS definition of annual migration, I can use higher-frequency measures
as needed for the purposes of the given research question. Finally, the large size
of the ACS sample provides high degree of precision for conducting many types of
detailed analyses. This proves particularly useful for the analyses in the following
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chapters, as the ability to compare several individuals located in the same place and
time allows me to control for many confounding labor market-related factors.
1.3 Migration Literature
The data described above began to be created at a time when theoretical
models of migration were starting to take shape. Much of the early literature de-
scribed the phenomenon as being driven by geographical differences in the supply
and demand for labor. Seminal studies such as Lewis (1954) introduced a 2-sector
model where equilibrium is restored by workers moving from the low-wage and
less capital-intensive agriculture sector, to the high-wage and more capital-intensive
manufacturing industry. These theories helped explain the movement from rural ar-
eas to cities that the U.S. had experienced earlier in the century, as well as spawned
a new field of study in international development.
The micro-economic foundations of migration focus on the incentives of in-
dividual workers to choose the location that will maximize their utility. Todaro
(1969) and Harris and Todaro (1970) described workers as seeking to maximize ex-
pected income, while taking into account the probability of unemployment. Sjaastad
(1962) discussed the costs of migration more explicitly, stating that the increase in
expected lifetime earnings must exceed both the monetary and non-monetary costs
of migrating.
While this basic neo-classical framework has continued to hold for decades, in
the latter part of the century the focus of the literature turned to identifying more
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specific determinants of migration, as summarized in Greenwood (1997). Many
studies have explored the mobility of different demographic groups, showing evidence
that young, higher skilled, and educated workers are more likely to move (Sjaastad,
1962; Borjas, 1991; Malamud and Wozniak, 2010). Household composition has
also been considered, with married couples and families with children appearing less
mobile in the data. The regional differences in amenity values has also been found to
influence migration, including factors such as public spending and services (Tiebout,
1956), or natural amenities like climate and geography (Knapp and Graves, 1989;
Mueser and Graves, 1995). Some studies have also focused on the cost side of
the decision, including the increased burden from moving longer distances (Davies
et al., 2001), and the risks associated with uncertainty (Schaeffer, 1988). Other
financial factors, such as housing costs and mortgage rates, have also been found to
be important (Cameron and Muellerbauer, 1998; Jackman and Savouri, 1992).
Research into the forces behind migration has become particularly important
in light of the dramatic drop in mobility during the Great Recesssion, as well as
the long-term decline over past decades, leading researchers to investigate possible
explanations1. Compositional explanations have been sought, especially with the
aging of the U.S. population and the fact that older workers tend to move less,
but these types of differences across demographic groups are not of a sufficient
magnitude to account for much of the overall decline (Molloy et al., 2011). The
business cycle has been shown to be important with migration rates exhibiting pro-
cyclical patterns, although this obviously does not explain the secular decline, nor
1This topic is reviewed extensively in Molloy et al., (2011).
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does it go far in accounting for the precipitate decline during the Great Recession
(Greenwood et al., 1997, Molloy et al., 2011).
One potential cause that has received a great amount of attention is the historic
collapse of the housing market leading up to and during the Great Recession, the
topic of my second chapter. The phenomenon of housing “lock-in” has been noted
since Genesove and Mayer (1997; 2001) showed evidence that homeowners who
had experienced a decline in their home equity were more reluctant in selling their
homes. This gave support to the theory that owing more on one’s mortgage than
the home is worth, a condition called “negative equity” or being “underwater”,
makes homeowners less likely to relocate. The possible implications for long-distance
migration led to an active literature in the topic, especially after the historic housing
collapse of the mid-2000s. While some earlier studies provided evidence of lock-in
hampering mobility, such as Chan (2001), Engelhardt (2003) and Ferreria, Gyourko,
and Tracy (2008), more recent studies of the period surrounding the Great Recession
and housing bust have tended to find no relationship (Dennet and Modestino, 2011;
Molloy et al., 2011; Schulhofer-Wohl, 2012; Farber, 2012; Valletta, 2013).
This literature, however, suffers from a few limitations that my newly created
data is well-suited to address. First of all, mobility in most of these studies is
detected ex-post, and thus nothing is known about homeownership in the original
location. While some studies make assumptions about prior homeownership, these
analyses are flawed if former homeowners become renters in their new location in
such a way that correlates with their prior negative equity status. Because my
data set is constructed in such a way that allows us to observe an individual’s
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migration outcome subsequent to being surveyed in their original location, I have
direct information about their ex-ante homeownership and equity status. Secondly,
all of the above studies depend on some kind of cross-geographic variation in housing
prices, by city, state, or region. Thus they are unable to fully account for many of
the differences between local labor markets, which may be correlated with local
house prices and potentially bias the results. Unlike the data sets used in these
prior studies, the data set I construct has both the geographic detail and the sample
size required to exploit within-labor market variation in house prices and mobility,
and thus compare owners and renters who are exposed to the same labor market
at the same time. Finally, while the previous studies based on surveys or tax data
measure residential mobility, the administrative jobs data that I use allow me to
detect where their subsequent jobs are located, thus providing a direct measure of
labor mobility. While residential and labor mobility are clearly correlated they are
not necessarily the same thing, due to factors such as long-distance commuting and
telework, and thus my data set allows us to observe the outcome most relevant to
the labor market.
Implicit in all the preceding discussion of the literature is the assumption that
migration is indeed a sign of a healthy and efficient labor market, and that anything
that causes it to decline is therefore a harmful labor market friction. This has been
a particular concern of economists in the wake of the Great Recession, who worry
that the inability of the unemployed to pick up and move could prolong their unem-
ployment spells and thus impede the economic recovery. However, the notion that
workers who choose to move will be better off than had they remained is relatively
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underexplored in the literature. Kennan and Walker (2011) employ a structural
estimation using the NLSY79 and find that locational decisions are consistent with
the maximization of lifetime income, but they do not consider the unemployed in
particular, or any shorter-term incentives that workers may have for moving. Stud-
ies focusing on the duration of unemployment spells of those who migrate compared
to those who stay in place, have generally found zero or negative effects of migrating
(Shumway, 2000; Pekkala and Tervo 2002). In the final chapter, I will employ my
novel data set to address this question, by leveraging the information on unemploy-
ment status in the ACS, along with the subsequent employment outcomes in the
LEHD data. This ability to observe the unemployment status of the worker be-
fore making their migration decision is advantageous compared to using the CPS or
other sources that only observe migrators after the fact. Also, because the decision
to change locations is endogenous to future employment outcomes, I will employ
an instrumental variable technique that benefits from the precision afforded by the
large size of my data set. Other longitudinal data sets, such as the NLSY, are
typically too small for such estimation. In fact, the only prior study that attempts
to systematically control for the endogeneity problem in a similar way uses a large
administrative database from outside the U.S. (Pekkala and Tervo, 2002).
1.4 Creating Measures of Migration
In this section, I discuss how migration is measured in the existing data as
well as in my new data source, and then compare some of the aggregate statistics
13
derived from them. When measuring migration, the first task is to define what sort
of geographic transition constitutes a “move” of interest. Because the theoretical
framework describes migration as an attempt to expose oneself to different economic
conditions that are superior to one’s present situation, economists are generally con-
cerned with measuring moves that represent a substantial change of an individual’s
local labor market.
Some standard definitions of labor markets have been created by government
statistical agencies such as the concept of a Metropolitan Statistical Area (MSA),
now known as a Core Based Statistical Area (CBSA), which groups collections of
counties connected to a common urban center based on commuting patterns. This
definition also proves useful for studies considering the housing market, as in my
research here, since these boundaries also generally enclose the areas where the local
workforce resides. Thus, a move to or from a CBSA likely represents a change in
housing markets as well as labor markets. Several of the publically-available data
sets described above are capable of providing CBSA-level information, although
changing definitions of CBSA boundaries cause some complications for researchers.
With county-level information, however, CBSAs can be reconstructed even if the
data source does not explicitly report them. Other narrowly defined labor market
areas include Economic Areas (EA), Public-Use Microdata Areas (PUMA), and
Workforce Investment Areas (WIA), although these are generally less available in
public data.
Because these definitions of labor markets do not cover the entire country,
by generally excluding rural areas, any statistics aggregated to these levels will by
14
definition be less than comprehensive. As such, many aggregated statistics report
cross-state migration, thus capturing all migration within US borders in a way that
is consistent over time. Despite the fact that some labor markets span across state
borders, state-to-state moves also generally represent a substantial change in one’s
employment situation and economic conditions. Tracking moves across groups of
states composing the four Census Regions also generates broad and meaningful
measures of national migration. These types of definitions also provide the best
point of comparison between different data sources, as nearly all data sets provide
information at least at the state level, whereas they may not report narrower units
of geography. Thus while I will use CBSAs as the basis for testing the hypotheses in
my analytical chapters, later in this section I will also report some measures of cross-
state and cross-region migration rates in order to compare my new data set with
other sources. Because the LEHD microdata provides geographic detail about the
establishment where an individual works down to the Census block, I can aggregate
my measures of migration to virtually any geographic level.
Additionally, researchers must select the timespan over which to consider mi-
gration. This selection may obviously depend on the topic at hand, although dif-
ferent data sets offer more or less flexibility in terms of timing. In the Decennial
Census, ACS, and CPS the time period is defined as either 1 year or 5 years prior
to the survey date, with no further ability for the researcher to vary the timeframe.
However, those surveys that include the individual’s place of birth do allow for a
measure of lifetime mobility or return migration, although place of birth does not
necessarily denote a location where someone has spent an extended period of time.
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Also note that with these retrospective questions it is possible that there have been
multiple moves since the reference period, and thus some migration may go unob-
served, especially in the case of the 5-year migration question. This concern is true
for all measures based on two distinct start and end points, rather than a continuous
longitudinal tracking.
The longitudinal data sources, on the other hand, provide more options for se-
lecting a time span over which to detect migration. The SIPP interviews participants
every 4 months, allowing for a high-frequency definition of migration, although the
same individuals are tracked for only 2-5 years depending on the particular panel.
The NLSY79 tracks participants for a long period of time, but interviews are only
conducted every two years as of 1994. The confidential IRS microdata allows the
researcher to track the location of tax filers (not dependents) annually, but the lack
of other covariates limits the possible analyses. My new data set, on the other hand,
takes advantage of the quarterly frequency of the LEHD employment data, allowing
for a higher-frequency measure of migration than other sources. Although designed
as an annual survey, the ACS microdata also provides a specific date of interview,
allowing the original time of observation to be placed in a specific month and quarter
as well. Therefore, any individual appearing in the ACS at any point can be tracked
quarterly in the LEHD data for all subsequent time periods.
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1.4.1 Comparing Migration Rates Between Data Sources
Next we look at aggregate migration statistics calculated using some of the
data sets described above. In particular, we will see how these rates have changed
over time, and how the metrics from my new data source compare to those that
are typically used. For reference, statistics from the other sources are taken from
the work of Molloy et al. (2011), which provide a comprehensive overview of facts
about migration in the United States.
The fraction of people who are observed relocating during the course of a year
is small but significant, and has been found to be fairly consistent across different
data sources. In order to make comparisons with existing measures, Figure 1.1
displays the annual migration rates as calculated from my new ACS-LEHD data
set, for the time period representing 2002-2012. While the construction of the data
will be described in more detail in subsequent chapters, annual migration is defined
as being observed as newly employed in the LEHD system in a different location
than where one was originally observed in the ACS, within four quarters of the
interview date. The figure shows the average mobility rates for all individuals aged
18-65, weighted by the inverse propensity of appearing in the ACS.
17




















2002q1 2004q1 2006q1 2008q1 2010q1 2012q1
Inter−CBSA migration Inter−State migration
Inter−Region migration
18
The rate at which individuals move across broad regions, (defined as the four
Census Regions of Northeast, Midwest, South, and West), has ranged between 1.1
and 1.5% and has been declining over much of the sample period. While the rate
appears to rise slightly over the first part of the decade, note that this coincides with
a time in which new states were being added to the LEHD data, thus mechanically
increasing the detection of migration2. By 2005, however, when nearly all states
were included, the rate begins to nonetheless fall. The steepest period of decline
occured between 2005-2008, coinciding with the housing crisis and beginning of the
Great Recession, with some stabilization in the rates occuring thereafter. These
magnitudes and features of the data are similar to those found by Molloy et al.
(2011), especially to those derived from the ACS and IRS data. As noted by those
authors, the CPS migration measures are consistently lower than in all other sources
during recent years, although the precise reasons are unknown. While the time-series
of the ACS-LEHD statistics only go back to 2002, the declining rate appears to be
a continuation of the decline that has been observed in the CPS going back to at
least 1980, with most measures also displaying a particularly steep decline during
the Great Recession.
Inter-state migration rates have hovered around 3% on an annual basis, imply-
ing that about half of inter-state moves occur within the same region of the country.
Inter-CBSA moves are somewhat higher at 3-4% annually, reflecting the fact that
some individuals are observed changing labor markets within the same state. These
2Further description of the varying geographic coverage in the LEHD data, and the resulting
measurement issues, is provided in Chapter 2.
19
numbers are roughly comparable to the corresponding measures in the ACS and
IRS data, albeit higher by a couple tenths of a percentage point3. Note however,
that while my sample measures the job mobility of individuals aged 18-65, other
sources generally measure household mobility weighted by the number of residents,
who may be younger or older than the 18-65 age range. In other words, it should
perhaps not be surprising that a migration rate based on the observed job mobility
of the working age population is somewhat higher than the residential mobility rate
of the population at large.
In order to make more detailed comparisons between data sources, Table 1.1 re-
ports the average annual migration rate for various demographic and socio-economic
subgroups in the ACS-LEHD data set compared to the corresponding calculations
from the CPS during the first decade of the 2000s. Due to the start date of the
LEHD data, however, the decade is truncated by 1 year in my data set.
3For comparison, see Figure 2 in Molloy et al. (2010).
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Table 1.1: Migration Rates by Subgroups: ACS-LEHD Dataset vs. CPS
ACS-LEHD Dataset: 2002-2010 CPS: 2001-2010












Less than high school 2.7 1.0
High School 2.4 1.2





Not in Labor Force 2.3 1.5
Income:
Bottom 50% 2.8 1.7
Top 50% 3.0 1.6
Children in the household:
No children 3.1 2.0




Notes: The left column reports mean 4-qtr inter-state migration rates for the given subgroup
across the entire period in the combined ACS-LEHD data set, weighted by the ACS survey weight.
The right column reports the corresponding 1-yr (retrospective) migration rate from the CPS, as
calculated by Molloy, Smith and Wozniak (2011). All stratifying variables are based on similar
definitions between the two surveys.
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We see that while the rates calculated from the ACS-LEHD data set are uni-
formly higher than those in the CPS, due to reasons mentioned above, the patterns
across the subgroups largely mirror one another in the two data sources. Demo-
graphic differences are evident in the table, with males being found to have a slightly
higher mobility rate than females, and younger workers appearing far more mobile
than those approaching retirement age. Also, whites are somewhat more mobile
than African Americans, and the college educated are the most mobile educational
group. Household factors are also significant, as households with children display
less mobility. Additionally, there is a large discrepancy between homeowners and
renters, with those who live in an owner-occupied home being far less likely to
move. While this clearly conflates many demographic differences between owners
and renters, measures like these have led researchers to investigate the hindering
effects that homeownership may have on mobility, particularly in the context of the
housing bust of the 2000s that left many owners underwater on their mortgages –
thus motivating the analysis in the following chapter. There are also stark differ-
ences across employment statuses, with the unemployed displaying mobility rates
nearly twice as high as for the employed. This is consistent with the notion that the
unemployed use migration as a way to escape joblessness, also a topic that I address
in a later chapter.
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1.5 Conclusion
This chapter has discussed the different sources of data that are employed in
the research of internal migration, and motivated the use of a novel data source that
combines survey and administrative sources in order to address some shortcomings
in the migration literature. In contrast to the existing sources of data, this combined
ACS-LEHD data simultaneously provides a direct and flexible measurement of la-
bor mobility, a large sample size, and the crucial ability to observe the conditions of
individuals prior to the migration decision. This allows me to more accurately study
the determinants of migration, such as homeownership, as well as study the conse-
quences for certain segments of the population, such as the unemployed. The typical
data sources used in the field are not as well-suited to addressing these topics, as
they either detect migration retrospectively and thus do not record homeownerhsip
and employment status at the origin location, or else are too small to provide a high
degree of statistical precision.
Identifying the reasons for the recent decline in geographic mobility is very
much an ongoing inquiry, as is the search into its ramifications for the labor market.
The two analytical chapters that follow will use my newly created data set in order
to test a pair of hypotheses that address these issues. In my first analysis, I find
that a homeowner who has experienced a decline in the value in their home are
substantially less likely to be observed starting a new job in a different location,
compared to a comparable renter in the same place and time. I find some evidence of
lock-in affecting the unemployed, although the implied impact on the unemployment
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rate is not likely to be significant. The final chapter asks whether the assumption
that migration is beneficial for the unemployed is a good one, as little empirical data
currently exists to support it. Indeed, my findings show that unemployed workers
who move are able find employment in a shorter time frame than they would have
had they remained, thus suggesting that mobility is indeed a valuable tool for such
disadvantaged workers.
Whether or not migration is particularly important for underwater homeown-
ers, the unemployed, or other vulnerable subgroups, the recent decline in geographic
mobility should be viewed in the context of a widespread decline of labor market
dynamics more generally, which may have serious and long-lasting effects on the
economy. While the popular notion is that workers today switch their jobs more
frequently than in the past, echoing the idea of the U.S. as a mobile nation, a growing
body of data and research suggest that neither is the case (Molloy et al., 2011; Hyatt
and Spletzer, 2013). This decline in fluidity appears to hold true on the firm side as
well, with U.S. businesses exhibiting lower entry and exit rates over recent decades
(Decker et al., 2014). While this may reflect a natural shift in the way resources
are allocated in the modern economy, researchers have expressed concerns about
the potential consequences for labor market search, wage increases, unemployment
duration, as well as output and productivity growth (Davis and Haltiwanger, 2014;
Hyatt and Spletzer, 2014; Molloy and Wozniak, 2011). No single factor has been
found to explain much of the decline in these dynamics, although many have posited
that they are interrelated (Molloy, Smith, and Wozniak, 2014). Thus, in exploring
the issues that lead to and stem from migration, one must keep in mind that the
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movement of workers across the country is inextricably tied to the labor market as
a whole. Exploring these complex interactions will obviously be a field of study for
years to come, and it is clear that new and improved data sources, such as the one
described here, will be useful in providing answers to these questions.
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Chapter 2: Falling House Prices and Labor Mobility: Testing the
Lock-In Hypothesis
2.1 Introduction
The mobility of labor has long been considered a hallmark strength of the
U.S. economy, however, during the Great Recession the fraction of Americans that
migrated between states fell to levels not seen in half a century (Molloy, Smith,
and Wozniak, 2011). Many researchers and commentators have suggested that a
driving force behind this decline was the historic collapse of the housing market,
which left workers unable or unwilling to sell their homes. In this chapter, I explore
this hypothesis that falling house prices deter American workers from relocating to
different areas for new jobs, by effectively trapping them in their current residence.
With nearly a third of all homeowners in 2009 owing more on their mortgages than
their homes were worth, referred to as a being in “negative equity” or “underwater”,
and with millions remaining in this situation today, the consequences of the so-called
“lock-in” effect for geographic mobility could indeed be dire.
Such an impact on migration could be harmful to the broader economy in
multiple ways. First of all, if a crash in housing prices reduces out-migration partic-
ularly from the distressed areas that are hit hardest by the economic downturn, it
could impede the efficient reallocation of labor and potentially exacerbate the type
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of “jobless recovery” that marked the years following the Great Recession1. In other
words, the housing market may be serving as a friction that increases the baseline
level of structural unemployment. However, besides the immediate job prospects for
the unemployed, lock-in may also hinder the efficient reallocation of labor across the
country in terms of overall job flows, by preventing the normal search process that
leads to high quality job matches. As argued by Davis and Haltiwanger (2014) this
decline in worker fluidity can in turn affect overall employment and productivy levels
in the long run. Indeed, it is well documented that many types of these job-to-job
flows decreased substantially during the Great Recession (Hyatt and McEntarfer,
2012), and deterred migration may be one factor contributing to this downturn.
Nevertheless, it is theoretically ambiguous whether a crash in housing prices
should directly hinder labor mobility. In fact, one may even expect to see an increase
in mobility as a consequence, because falling house prices and the resulting negative
equity have been shown to be the driving forces behind home foreclosures (Gerardi,
Shapiro and Willen, 2008). The estimated 11 million households that went into
foreclosure between 2007-2010 represent a group of workers who were potentially
more mobile due to the housing collapse2. Furthermore, lower prices do not, in and
of themselves, provide a financial disincentive to relocating, since the diminished
proceeds from selling one’s home are mitigated by the lower prices that other homes
can be bought for across the country. In fact, lower house prices can lessen some of
transaction costs of moving, particularly those that are based on a percentage of a
1For an example of such concerns, see commentary by Lawrence Katz, New York Times Jan.
10, 2010.
2RealtyTrac, U.S. Foreclosure Market Report 2010.
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home’s value, such as broker fees and taxes.
There are two principal reasons, however, why researchers have generally hy-
pothesized that labor mobility should fall as a result of declining home prices. First,
homeowners who are underwater on their mortgages may avoid relocating if they
do not have the liquidity to cover the monetary costs associated with moving and
buying a new home, such as the required down payment, as well as taxes and trans-
action costs. The housing finance literature has long focused on the role of such
financial constraints in the decision to sell one’s home, developing models to explain
how changes in house prices, interest rates, and down payment requirements affect
turnover in the housing market (Quigley, 1987; Stein, 1995).
Secondly, even if such financial constraints are not binding, homeowners may
be unwilling to move if it forces them to realize a capital loss on their homes
(Genesove and Mayer, 1997). This notion of nominal loss aversion stems from
the prospect theory literature pioneered by Kahnemann and Tversky (1979), who
demonstrate how a utility function that is kinked or discontinuous at a “reference
point” can cause individuals to react strongly to nominal losses. Thus, if an owner
is unable sell their home for at least a certain amount, such as the original purchase
price, they may be particularly unwilling to sell their home.
While several empirical papers have explored the dynamics between house
prices and worker mobility, many data sources on migration only observe individuals
after they have moved, thus preventing a direct measurement of the conditions
contributing to geographic mobility. Furthermore, data that do allow researchers
to track individuals over time are not recorded with sufficient scope and frequency
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to account for other local economic factors that may influence both migration and
house prices. In this study, I will use the unique dataset introduced in Chapter 1,
which combines a large survey of individuals with administrative data on their job
histories across the country. This permits me to observe the homeownership status
of the large sample of workers in the ACS, and follow their subsequent employment
outcomes in the LEHD database in order to detect migration.
With these data I am able to measure the difference in migration propensities
between homeowners who are in negative equity and those who are not, relative to
a control group of renters who should be unaffected by changes in home values. By
incorporating localized house price information from the real-estate data company
Zillow, I test how a positive or negative change in home values since moving into
one’s residence differentially affects the out-migration propensities of homeowners
relative to renters in the same metropolitan area and time period. This type of
within-geography analysis will enable me to disentangle the influence of house prices
from the impact of unobserved local economic factors that also affect migration
behavior.
Specifically, using a within-CBSA and time regression specification, I find that
a homeowner who has experienced a nominal house price decline is 0.2 percentage
points less likely to migrate for new employment than a homeowner who has experi-
enced price growth, relative to the difference between equivalent renters. This indi-
cates that such a worker is approximately 12% less likely to relocate than the overall
sample average of homeowners. Moroever, given that a third of homeowners expe-
rienced such a decline after the housing bust, the implied effect would account for
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more than 20% of the 0.3 percentage point decline in homeowner mobility between
2006-2010. Other specifications, which measure the impact of a given percentage
change in home prices, show that a 25 percentage point drop in home prices would
translate into a 0.13 percentage point drop in average homeowner mobility, account-
ing for 40% of the observed decline. Additionally I find evidence that these effects
are also present in a subsample of unemployed workers, although they are mitigated
somewhat and do not suggest a significant impact on the national unemployment
rate.
The rest of this chapter is organized as follows. Section 2 discusses the pre-
vious evidence on housing lock-in, and motivates the use of my new data set for
tackling this hypothesis in a novel way. Section 3 describes the data sources and
the construction of the combined survey-administrative data set described above.
Section 4 explains how I measure labor migration in this data set, and reports some
of the aggregate migration statistics that are derived from it. Section 5 presents the
methodological framework, which is based on regressions that exploit the unique
within-CBSA and time variation. Section 6 presents the results of the analysis, in-
cluding baseline estimates, results focusing on the the population of the unemployed,
and a series of robustness analyses. Section 6 concludes.
2.2 Existing Literature and Motivation
The early empirical evidence on the lock-in phenomenon focused on the rami-
fications for the housing market itself, with Quigley (1987) finding that homeowners
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with favorable interest rate terms on their mortgages were less inclined to change
residences, since doing so would increase their monthly loan payment. Genesove and
Mayer (1997) was the first study to specifically consider the constraints resulting
from a lack of home equity, and using a sample of home sellers in Boston found that
those with high loan-to-value ratios tended to keep their houses on the market longer
in order to hold out for higher selling prices. In a subsequent paper, Genesove and
Mayer (2001) found that price changes also played an important role, with own-
ers experiencing nominal losses being more reluctant to sell. Ferreira, Gyourko,
and Tracy (2010) used measures of homeowner equity from the American Housing
Survey (AHS), and also found that negative equity leads to lock-in, reducing the
probability of moving from one’s residence by about 50 percent.
Despite the substantial body of evidence on the presence of lock-in, however,
it is important to note that this phenomenon does not necessarily translate into
a commensurate impact on job mobility. After all, the above-mentioned studies
employ housing unit-level data that do not follow an occupant after they move, and
consequently do not directly address geographic mobility. The fraction of workers
who are willing to migrate long distances for jobs at any given point in time is
relatively small, and it is not known a priori whether this sub-population is more
or less susceptible to the lock-in phenomenon than the average homeowner. It could
also be the case that workers who are presented with a employment opportunity
in another location are able to accept the new job without selling their house, for
example, by renting their home or by commuting long-distance. For these reasons,
in my empirical specification, I model the probability of a worker moving to a new
31
job in a different location–not simply selling one’s home–and estimate how house
price movements affect this propensity. Only in this way can we directly measure
whether the lock-in phenomenon has a significant effect on job mobility and the
economy-wide flow of labor.
Few previous studies have used individual-level longitudinal data that allow
the researcher to determine where an individual has moved to. Chan (2001) studies
homeowners in New York City, and concludes that those who faced financial con-
straints due to low home equity were 25-33 percent less likely to move. On the other
hand, Engelhardt (2003) finds some evidence that reduced home equity constrained
the inter-metropolitan mobility of young homeowners in the National Longitudinal
Survey of Youth between 1985-1996. Note that both of these studies are based on
small samples, however, and occurred well before the most recent recession. Because
my sample of ACS respondents from 2002-2012 is large and nationally representa-
tive, it offers an ideal setting to study lock-in during the historic collapse of housing
prices.
More recent studies following the Great Recession have begun to cast doubt
on the magnitude of the lock-in effect and its impact on labor mobility. Schulhofer-
Wohl (2010) offered a rebuttal to Ferreira et al. (2010), arguing that the construc-
tion of the AHS data is biased against observing mobility of underwater homeown-
ers3. Farber (2011) finds that the mobility of CPS and Displaced Worker Survey
(DWS) respondents does not differ significantly for homeowners compared to renters.
3Ferreira, Gyourko and Tracy (2011) defend their original findings in light of the Schulhofer-
Wohl (2010) critique.
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Employing a similar strategy, Valetta (2012) finds that the differential in the un-
employment durations between owners and renters in the CPS does not correlate
geographically to the severity of the housing downturn. Other studies that em-
ploy such cross-geographic comparisons include Aaronson and Davis (2011) with
the SIPP, Schmitt and Warner (2011) with the DWS, and Dennnet & Modestino
(2012) with IRS data, with all of these studies failing to find a correlation between
migration and regional house price changes.
Because migration is generally observed retrospectively in the data sources
used in these recent studies, such as the CPS and IRS data, an individual’s homeown-
ership status in their original location is not known. This makes analyses based on
comparisons of owners and renters difficult, although some studies have attempted
to infer past homeownership status based on current status (Farber, 2011). Such
assumptions could be problematic, however, if migrators tend to switch from own-
ing to renting a home in a way that is correlated with their negative equity status.
Additionally, as most of these prior studies are based on geographical differences in
house price movements, it is difficult to systematically control for the corresponding
differences in the local labor markets. This could bias cross-geographic analyses if
house price movements are correlated with other local economic factors, as we may
suspect they are.
Enhancing the ACS with the LEHD jobs data adds a longitudinal dimension
that allows me to address several of the above-mentioned shortcomings in the previ-
ous literature. Because the ACS provides the individual’s homeownership status in
their original location, I am able to directly observe the conditions facing an indi-
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vidual when they chose to relocate, and accurately identify homeowners and renters.
In addition, since the LEHD data includes the geographic location of each job, I
can directly observe labor mobility in contrast to many studies which only measure
residential mobility. Also, the size and scope of the sample provide me greater ge-
ographic, demographic, and temporal coverage than has been possible with most
studies. Crucially, the large size of the ACS sample provides sufficient variation to
conduct within-CBSA comparisons. The resulting difference-in-difference strategy
compares the migration propensities between owners with negative and positive eq-
uity relative to a control group of renters located in the same place and time, thus
controlling for local labor market conditions which may be correlated with housing
prices.
2.3 Data Sources and Sample Construction
The sample used in this study comes from the American Community Survey,
the largest annual survey of the American population conducted by the Census
Bureau, interviewing approximately 3.5 million households annually. In my analysis
I use all ACS respondents and spouses who are either homeowners or renters located
in one of 356 metropolitan areas for which the data on house prices are available.
Besides information on homeownership, the survey also provides data on how long
the respondent has been living in their current residence. Addditionally, the survey
contains a host of demographic and socio-economic variables. Since I am interested
only in the effects of lock-in on labor mobility, I restrict the sample to those aged 25-
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54. This prime-aged population excludes the youngest workers just finishing their
education, as well as those approaching retirement, as these workers’ locational
decisions are likely to be motivated by different factors than those that we are
considering here. The sample period spans the years 2002-2012, and the interview
date of the respondents is aggregated to the quarterly level for analysis. The size of
the ACS was smaller from 2002-2004 due to the survey being in beta status at that
time, however the within-time nature of the analysis eliminates any bias from this
feature of the data. After an ACS household is surveyed it is not surveyed again, so
until now there has been little opportunity to determine anything about the workers
in subsequent time periods.
It is for this purpose that I use the LEHD employment and earnings database, a
collection of Unemployment Insurance (UI) records from 50 participating states plus
the District of Columbia, which serves to generate statistics such as the Quarterly
Workforce Indicators (QWI). The data are recorded at the worker-employer (i.e.
“job”) level, and report the earnings that each worker receives from a given employer
during a particular quarter. These data are linked to information on the worker’s
employer establishment, sourced from the Quarterly Census of Employment and
Wages (ES202) database at the Bureau of Labor Statistics. UI-covered employment
represents over 95% of all private wage and salary civilian jobs and nearly all of the
state and local government workforce4. Groups not covered by the database include
the self-employed, the unemployed, and some government workers5.
4For more information on the data and construction of the LEHD infrastructure, see Abowd et
al. (2005).
5Workers with zero earnings in a given quarter are referred to as “non-employed”, which en-
compasses the unemployed as well as those who are unobserved for other reasons.
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With these data I can link an ACS individual via an individual identifier to
all of their LEHD-covered jobs during the period 2002-2013. The crucial piece of
information for the purpose of measuring migration is in the geographic location
of the employee’s workplace establishment. Although the workplace for a given
individual is imputed in the case of multi-unit employers, an individual is assumed
to remain at the same establishment for the length of their tenure with that firm.
Additionally, the imputation is largely based on the proximity of establishments to
an individual’s residence. Both these features therefore serve to bias against the
observation of spurious locational changes over time.
Geographic coverage of the LEHD data varies over the sample period, as more
and more states began submitting data throughout the 2000s. While only 45 states
are included at the beginning of my sample in 2002, the number rose to 49 by
2004, and 50 plus the Distric of Columbia starting in 2010. As a consequence, the
fraction of U.S. private employment covered by the data grew from 87% in 2002
to over 95% by 2010 (Abowd and Vilhuber, 2010). Due to this, I limit the sample
of ACS respondents to those who are residing in a state that is LEHD-covered at
the time of the ACS interview. However, the incomplete coverage clearly affects the
rate at which migration is detected, thus systematically suppressing the observed
migration propensities, especially during the early part of the sample. Again, in
the main regression analysis, the inclusion of time-specific geographical controls
should account for the fact that individuals located in a particular place and time
have a given set of destinations that they can be observed migrating to. However,
robustness checks will also be used to examine the sensitivity of the results to the
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varying geographic coverage.
The data on home values come from estimates by Zillow, a real estate data
analysis firm. Zillow’s proprietary algorithm estimates the value of each home, and
their published statistics provide the monthly median home value by zip code. This
can be linked to the residential location of each ACS respondent via a crosswalk
between the Census tract of residence and the Zip Code Tabulation Area (ZCTA).
By combining this with ACS information on how long the individual workers have
been living in their current residence, this enables a calculation of change in house
prices that is relevant to each worker’s tenure in their residence. This is important
because a fall in house prices will affect an owner who bought their house recently
more severely than one who bought long ago, since the longer tenured owners may
have past years of home appreciation to buffer them from recent losses. Additionally,
since the purchase price at the time the owner moved into the home may serve as
the reference point in the context of nominal loss aversion, such a price change is
expressed in relation to this point.
2.4 Defining Worker Migration
The hypothetical way by which lock-in can affect job migration is by prevent-
ing a current homeowner from taking a job located in a different area from their
current location, because to do so would likely require incurring the costs of chang-
ing residences. Therefore, in order to study such out-migration, we must first define
an appropriate unit of geography on which to base our analysis. For this purpose I
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employ the concept of a Consolidated Business Statistical Area (CBSA), formerly
known as metropolitan statistical areas (MSA), as defined by the Office of Man-
agement and Budget and the Census Bureau. A CBSA is a cluster of contiguous
counties surrounding at least one urban core, which are economically integrated
with the core as measured by commuting ties6. Larger areas with cores of over
50,000 people are called metropolitan areas, while those with smaller cores of 10-50
thousand are known as micropolitan areas. This level of geography is well-suited for
studying the interaction between housing markets and the out-migration of labor,
since the CBSA is roughly defined as the area in which the workforce of a particular
employment node also resides. Consequently, a worker who considers taking a new
job outside of the CBSA must likely also consider the required change in residence,
making this precisely the sort of job decision that is vulnerable to the influence of
housing lock-in.
The outcome of interest in the following analysis is based on the concept of an
out-migrator, a worker who leaves a particular metropolitan area in order to take a
job in another location. The theory of lock-in predicts that a homeowner who has
experienced house price depreciation will be less likely to transition to a new job in
another area, because they are less willing or able to make the necessary change in
residence than they would be otherwise. Thus, I define an out-migrator (or mover),
mijt = 1, when the following criteria are satisfied:
1. An ACS respondent i is observed residing in CBSA j during quarter t
6See OMB publication 10-02, December 2009.
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2. According to the LEHD database, individual i is no longer working in CBSA
j in quarter t + 1.
3. Individual i is observed beginning a new job (new employee-employer pair) at
an establishment located in another area −j, within the threshold number of
quarters of t.
On top of these three basic parameters, a few other qualifications must be
made. For instance, if a new observed job located in −j begins in the same quarter
t as the ACS interview date, this job is required to last until at least t + 1 in order
to eliminate the possibility that this job in fact began before the ACS interview.
Also, in case of multiple new jobs beginning at the same time, only the job with
the highest earnings (or dominant job) is considered. Beginning a new job in a
geographically adjacent CBSA that is considered to be connected to ones previous
CBSA by commuting ties, defined as being part of the same Combined Statistical
Area (CSA), is not counted as a move. Likewise, a new job located in a rural
area of the same state will neither be considered to be a move. The 1-quarter
threshold condition is meant to exclude cases where long periods of time have gone
unaccounted for and therefore may not represent a clean employment transition,
due to unobserved intervening unemployment or other non-covered employment.
However, increased timing thresholds of two and four quarters will be also used in
alternate specifications for robustness.
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2.4.1 Aggregate Migration Rates
With this definition of out-migration in hand, we can measure aggregate
CBSA-level migration rates by calculating (ΣNi=1mijt)/N over all workers i in quarter
t. This measure expresses the propensity of the metropolitan workforce in time t
to transition to a new job outside of the CBSA where a given worker is originally
located. Figure 2.1 displays the time-series of the aggregate migration statistics
during the sample period 2002q1-2012q3.
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Panel (a) shows the national migration rate for all individuals age 25-54, and
we see that the migration rate declined throughout the decade, a feature of the
data that has previously been noted in studies using other measures such as rates of
interstate migration calculated using the CPS (Molloy et al., 2011). The quarterly
CBSA-level out-migration rate stood at roughly 2.5% in the early part of the decade
but had declined to below 2% by 2009:Q3. Also apparent is that the decline acceler-
ated in the period between late-2007 and late-2009, corresponding with the housing
crash as well as the Great Recession. Rates began to rebound by 2010, although
only recovered about one third of their total losses by the end of the sample period
in 2012. Out-migration rates using the 2 and 4 quarter thresholds reveal similar pat-
terns, as seen in Panel (b). Finally, Panel (c) shows that regional variation exists as
well, with the South Census region exhibiting the highest out-migration rates, and
the Northeast the lowest. In terms of percentage change the West region saw the
most dramatic decline, which coincides with the area of the country that was hit
hardest by the housing bust.
Given the issues of LEHD coverage discussed above, the migration rates for the
early part of the decade are less accurately measured because the set of destination
states that individuals can be observed migrating to is reduced7. Furthermore, the
missing states eventually joined LEHD at different times during the sample period,
creating a somewhat inconsistent measure of migration. To assess the extent of this
mismeasurement, Figure 2.2 plots the 1-qtr migration rate calculated exclusively
7States not included in the LEHD data as of the beginning of 2002 are: AZ, AR, DC, MA, ME,
and NH.
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from the set of 45 states that were consistently present throughout the entire sample,
using only those same states as potential destinations for migration. As seen in the
figure, this measure does not differ significantly from the measure using all states.
While the discrepancy widens somewhat in the later years due to the changes in the
underlying sample, the difference rarely exceeds a few hundredths of a percentage
point, and the patterns mirror one another. Thus, due to these similarities, the
entire sample of states will be used for the remainder of the analysis, although the
consistent sample of states will be used later to test robustness.
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Table 2.1 reports the CBSA-level migration rates for various demographic and
socio-economic groups. The patterns confirm some of the stylized facts about migra-
tion that have previously been demonstrated with other data sources, as discussed
in Chapter 1.
Table 2.1: CBSA-Level Migration Rates by Demographic Characteristics
1-qtr. Migration Rate 2-qtr Migration Rate 4-qtr Migration Rate
Sex:
Female 2.0 2.5 3.1
Male 2.5 2.9 3.5
Age:
25-35 3.0 3.7 4.5
36-45 2.2 2.5 3.1
46-55 1.7 2.1 2.6
Race:
White 2.2 2.6 3.2
Non-white 2.4 2.8 3.5
Education:
Less than high school 1.9 2.2 2.8
High School 2.3 2.8 3.4
Some college 2.4 2.9 3.5
College+ 2.8 3.3 4.2
Employment Status:
Employed 1.9 2.2 2.6
Unemployed 7.6 9.5 11.0
Not in Labor Force 2.3 3.1 4.4
Income:
Top quartile 2.6 3.1 3.9
2nd quartile 1.9 2.2 2.6
3rd quartile 2.9 3.4 2.9
Bottom quartile 2.9 3.8 5.1
Marital Status:
Married 2.1 2.5 3.1
Unmarried 2.6 3.1 3.9
Children in the household:
No children 2.3 2.7 3.4
At least one child 2.2 2.6 3.2
Homeownership:
Renters 3.3 3.9 4.9
Owners 1.7 2.1 2.6
Notes: Table reports percentage of demographic subsample that is observed out-migrating from
their CBSA of residence according to a certain threshold. Demographic information is as reported
on the ACS, and migration is subsequently observed in the LEHD employment data according to
the above definition.
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For example, migration rates are highest for the youngest age group, and de-
cline monotonically with age. The higher educated also display high migration rates
compared to those with less education. Males have relatively high migration rates,
as do unmarried people and households without children. Figure 2.3 shows the time-
series of migration rates for these demographic categories, and we see that there is
some variation over time in the differences between these groups. In the later re-
gression analysis, we must consider whether such changes in relative migration rates
may be correlated with homeownership and price changes, because unobserved fac-
tors may have heteregeneous effects on these demographic groups and thus confound
the analysis.
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Figure 2.4 depicts the time-series of metropolitan out-migration separately for
owners and renters on the national level. As seen back in 2.10, the mean migration
rate for renters is 3.3% across the sample period compared to 1.7% for owners, thus
the two lines are plotted here on different scales. Note, however, that this large mean
difference is due partially to demographic differences, which are not controlled for
here in the unconditional rates. However, comparing how the propensities of these
two groups change over time can be instructive, and mirrors the strategy of the
regression analysis that follows.
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The figure reveals that the two time series tracked eachother quite closely in
the early part of the decade, but began to diverge by late-2005 when the migration
rate of owners began to trend downwards somewhat. The migration rate for renters
remains relatively steady until 2007 when the rates for both groups began to plunge.
However, in 2010 it appears that the mobility rates for renters stabilized and and
even started to rise, whereas the rate for owners has continued to drift slightly
downward. Such differences in the mobility of owners and renters have not been
noted in other studies using different data sources, although few such studies have
used data through 2012. While this evidence is merely suggestive, we now turn to
within-CBSA-time regressions in order to systematically control for differences in
individual characteristics and confounding labor market factors.
2.5 Within-CBSA and Time Estimation
The goal of the key regressions that follow is to isolate the impact of house
price changes on the out-migration propensity of homeowners, using the concept of
migration defined above. To properly account for the many possible confounding
factors that vary at the CBSA-time level, the estimation strategy uses individual-
level data that vary by homeownership status, zip-code level house price exposure,
and time since moving into their home. This methodology allows me to conduct
a within-CBSA and time analysis that controls for CBSA-specific time shocks by
comparing the response of homeowners to house price changes relative to a compa-
rable set of renters located in the same CBSA and time period. Since experiencing
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a decline in house prices should not directly impact the migration decision of those
who are renting, the differential impact of house price changes on owners relative to
renters will be representative of the direct effect on owners. This use of renters as a
comparison group, a technique used frequently in the literature, amounts essentially
to the following differences-in-differences comparison:
[P (migrate/Ownerjt∆HousePrice<0)− P (migrate/Ownerjt∆HousePrice>0)] (2.1)
−[P (migrate/Renterjt∆HousePrice<0)− P (migrate/Renterjt∆HousePrice>0)]
where both Owners and Renters living in the same CBSA j and time t are
distinguished by whether they have experienced either negative price appreciation,
∆HousePrice < 0, or positive price appreciation, ∆HousePrice > 0, since moving
into their homes. If this term is negative, it means that the impact of experiencing a
price decline is greater for owners than for renters, thus reflecting the direct effects of
the loss of equity. The unobserved labor market factors in CBSA j at time t, which
may be correlated with house prices, affect both groups equally and will therefore
be partialed out with the inclusion of CBSA*time level dummies. Similarly, any
general correlation between house prices and migration that is common to owners
and renters will also be differenced out by these CBSA-time controls.
Note that renters can indeed be affected by factors that are reflected in house
prices, such as amenity values, including neighborhood quality, crime, public ser-
vices, environmental factors, and other factors pertaining to the microeconomy of
a local area. The impact of amenities on migration has long been studied in the
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migration literature since Thiebout (1952), as has their effect on property values
(Kain and Quigley, 1970; Cheshire and Sheppard, 1995). Thus while not strictly a
control group, renters are assumed to be equally affected by these indirect factors
as owners, allowing us to ascribe any differential impact to the additional influence
of changes in home equity on owners.
The individual-level data allow me to include individualized measures of hous-
ing price change, as well as personal characteristics that may also be correlated with
migration and housing related factors. Therefore, the resulting regression specifica-
tion takes the general form:
P (mijt = 1) = β
′
1HousePricesit ∗Ownijt + β′2Ownijt + β′3HousePricesit (2.2)
+γjt + OtherControls + εijt
where HousePricesit is a variable expressing the individual’s change in house prices.
The slate of dummy variables, γjt, ensures that identification is based solely on
within-CBSA and time variation.
The dependent variable is the individual probability of out-migrating, P (mijt),
where m is a {0, 1} dummy indicating whether the ACS individual i, observed during
time t, switches to a job in a location other than his current CBSA of residence j,
according to the criteria stated in the section above. The threshold used to define
migration will typically be the 1-quarter definition in most specifications, but the
2- and 4-quarter thresholds will also be used for robustness. The key explanatory
variable in the analysis is an interaction term between the individual’s change in
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house prices and an indicator of whether an individual is living in an owner-occupied
home or not. Thus we let Ownijt = 1 if individual i lives in an owner-occupied house
in CBSA j in time t and 0 if they live in a rented home, according to the ACS. This
interaction term thus expresses the differential impact of house price on owners, and
reflects the direct effect of changes in home equity.
2.5.1 House Price Variables
The construction of the house price variables is meant to express the change in
prices that the individual has experienced since moving into his or her home, which
proxies for a gain or loss in home equity. Letting t0i be the move-in quarter of person
i according to the ACS response, I can estimate a percentage change in house price
relevant to an individual’s experience as:
∆ln(HPIit) = ln(HPIzjt)− ln(HPIzjt0i )
where HPIzjt is the Zillow house price index value for person i located in zip-code
z (within CBSA j) at time t, and HPIzjt0i is the index at time t
0
i . In turn we also
define:
neg equityit if ∆ln(HPIit) < 0, otherwise 0
which expresses whether an individual has experienced a home price decline since
moving in to their residence, and can be interpreted as a proxy for negative equity
amongst homeowners. As Zillow data only goes back to the late 1990’s for most
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metropolitan areas, any individuals who moved into their home prior to the start
date of the data are assigned the earliest available figure for that zip-code. There is
some variation in when Zillow begins to report price data for different CBSAs, but
the within-CBSA nature of the analysis will account for these discrepancies. Also,
because the ACS does not define geography based on postal zip codes, I determine
the zip code of residence using a crosswalk between an individual’s census tract of
residence and the corresponding Zip Code Tabulation Area (ZCTA), as defined by
the Census Bureau.
While house price declines are a necessary condition for negative equity, this
estimate of negative equity status is of course inexact since we have no information
on other things affecting home equity such as downpayments, second-mortgages and
home equity loans. Estimates from the housing bubble years of 2001-2005 suggest
that the median loan-to-value ratio at the time of mortgage origination was close to
90% (Demyanyk and Van Hemert, 2011). Thus, the proxy will likely overestimate
the incidence of negative equity although for reasons discussed above, recall that
a nominal price decline may in itself be a deterrent to selling one’s home due to
loss aversion. Figure 2.5 shows the “negative equity” rate for the entire sample of
owners and renters, signifying the percent of the population that has experienced a
decline in the value of their home during their tenure.
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Due to a strong housing market in the 90s and early 2000s, this rate began
virtually at zero in the early years of the sample, but began to rise in late 2006 until
late 2010 when it reached around 35% nationally. During the last two years of the
sample, however, the rate began to decline dramatically as house prices began to
recover. Similarly, Figure 2.6 shows the mean home price appreciation over time,
which rose from approximately 30% at the beginning of the sample to over 50% in
2006, before tumbling down below 20% by 2011.
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In order to visualize the variation in the home price data, Figure 2.7 shows the
distribution of the individual home price changes, as well as the residual values after
regressing the price change variable on the γjt, Own ∗ γj and Own ∗ γt dummies.
Due to the differences in prices on the zip-code level, and in the lengths of time that
individuals spend in their homes, a significant amount of variation remains. There is
also substantial variation over time, both before and after the housing crash. Figure
2.8 shows that the distribution was highly skewed rightward before the peak of the
market in 2006q3, but became much more symmetrical between gains and losses
after the decline.
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Thus, given these two measures of house price changes, the crucial independent
variable in the regression is denoted as HousePricesit∗Ownijt, where HousePricesit
equals either ∆ln(HPIit) or neg equityit depending on the specification. The coef-
ficient on this variable can be interpreted as the differential effect of house prices on
the out-migration decision on homeowners, relative to renters.
2.5.2 Control Variables
A variety of controls are used to ensure identification. First the crucial slate
of CBSA-quarter level dummies, γjt, will control for CBSA-specific, time-variant
shocks such as the local labor market conditions that affect buyers and renters
equally. Two more sets of dummies, Own ∗ γj and Own ∗ γt, will control for the
average migration propensities of homeowners by CBSA or quarterly time period,
respectively. These account for the fact that the migration propensity of owners
is naturally different from that of renters, and this difference may vary by labor
market, or over time on a national level. Note that since there are three levels of
variation–CBSA, time, and ownership status–all three pairwise interaction terms can
be included. Another key control accounts for the length of time that an individual
has been living in their current residence, represented by a slate of yearly dummies
φd (where d=1 through 49 years, and 50+). This is important both because housing
tenure duration is likely a strong indicator of one’s willingness to move, and also
because the individual-specific house price variables are related to tenure length by
construction. Finally, I include the individual-level Xit variables for age, sex, race,
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education, earnings quartile, marital status and presence of children, all as reported
in the ACS.
Identification rests on the assumption that the homeownership decision is ex-
ogenous to unobserved factors that might be correlated with both house prices
and migration propensities. Buyers and renters are clearly different even beyond
their demographic compositions, due to factors related to self-selection, therefore
their migration propensities will naturally differ. However, the previously described
dummy variables control for the different mean migration propensities between the
two groups, and these mean differences are even allowed to vary by CBSA (Own∗γj)
as well as by time nationally (Own ∗ γt). Identification will only be threatened if
there are unobserved factors that affect the changes in the relative migration propen-
sities of owners and renters in a way that is correlated with changes in house prices.
For instance, if house prices changes are correlated with something that has het-
erogeneous effects on migration for people with different characteristics, and these
characteristics are strong determinants of homeownership status, it could lead us
to incorrectly conclude that the migration of owners is being directly impacted by
house price changes. Thus later we will explore possible heterogeneity in a series of
robustness checks. Absent such confounding factors, however, if the respective mi-
gration rates of homeowners and renters react differently to house price movements,
(after accounting for observable differences), it is due to the direct effect of prices
on owners, in particular through the home equity channel.
Given the above definitions of all the variables, we can now write the complete
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regression specification:
P (mijt = 1) = α + β
′
1neg equityit ∗Ownijt + β′2Ownijt + β′3neg equityit (2.3)
+Ownijt ∗ γj + Ownijt ∗ γt + φd + θ′Xit
+γjt + εijt
Here, β1 expresses the magnitude of this differential, since it represents the
interactive effect between homeownership and the proxy for whether a worker has
experienced declines in home prices during their tenure. A negative β1 would indi-
cate that the outmigration of owners is more negatively correlated with the negative
equity proxy than the outmigration of renters, supporting the hypothesis that a de-
cline in home equity decreases the propensity of homeowners to out-migrate.
In alternative specifications, we will use an independent variable expressing
the log change in home prices instead of the negative equity dummy. The resulting
equation is thus:
P (mijt = 1) = α + β
′
1∆ln(HPIit) ∗Ownijt + β′2Ownijt + β′3∆ln(HPIit) (2.4)
+Ownijt ∗ γj + Ownijt ∗ γt + φd + θ′Xit
+γjt + εijt
In this case, β1 expresses the magnitude of the differential impact of a given
percentage change in home prices on the migration propensities of owners. Here a
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β1 > 0 means that the outmigration of owners is more positively correlated with
house price changes relative to renters, indicating the direct impact of changes in
home equity on owners. In other words, it is a positive sign on the key interaction
term that would support the lock-in hypothesis.
A linear probability model (LPM) is used to to specify P (mijt = 1). While
Probit and logit are other natural candidates for such estimation, the LPM is more
straightforward for interpreting the marginal effects8. While index models are ad-
vantageous in that they restrict the support of the probability space to the unit
interval, the inclusion of the large number of binary variables renders the estima-




The first estimation uses the whole ACS prime-aged worker sample to test for
the lock-in phenomenon. As described above, this baseline specification is designed
to estimate whether the measures of the change in house prices are associated with
a decrease in a homeowner’s probability of beginning a new job in another location,
relative to the effects on similar renters. For these baseline regressions, recall that the
sample of workers is composed of all ACS reference-persons and their spouses living
in the same home, both homeowners and renters, restricted to be of prime working
8When a Probit is run on the baseline specification in equation 2.3, results are found to be
qualitatively similar to the LPM.
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age and located in one of 356 CBSAs. Standard errors in this specification, and all
following tests, will be clustered by CBSA to control for the broad range of error
dependencies that can occur between individuals residing in the same CBSA. Each
regression is also weighted by the ACS survey weight, called the “person weight”,
which expresses the inverse of the probability of a given individual being sampled.
Summary statistics for the baseline regression sample are shown in Table 2.2.
Table 2.2: Summary Statistics
Variable Mean Std. Dev.
Migrate 1q 0.021 0.142
Migrate 2q 0.024 0.155
Migrate 4q 0.03 0.171
Own 0.76 0.427
∆ln(HPI) 0.31 0.367
Neg Equity 0.216 0.412
Female 0.536 0.499
Non− white 0.192 0.394
Married 0.722 0.448
Children 0.439 0.496
Age25− 34 0.226 0.418
Age35− 44 0.264 0.441
Age45− 54 0.223 0.416
Less than High School 0.081 0.274
High School 0.235 0.424
Some College 0.313 0.464
College+ 0.37 0.483
Earn quartile 1 0.25 0.421
Earn quartile 2 0.25 0.421
Earn quartile 3 0.25 0.421
Earn quartile 4 0.25 0.421
Employed 0.762 0.426
Unemployed 0.042 0.2
Not in Labor Force 0.196 0.397
N = 7, 300, 000
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Results from these baseline specifications are shown in Table 2.3. Column 1
reports the results from using the negative equity proxy, and the coefficient of -.002
on the interaction with homeownership reflects the differential impact of negative
equity, compared to renters. This implies that experiencing a nominal house price
decline is associated with a 0.2 percentage point decrease in the outmigration rate of
owners with negative equity compared to those with positive equity. With a sample
average migration rate of 1.7% for homeowners, this implies that a underwater
homeowner is approximately 12% less likely to relocate than average. Given the
precipitate decline in migration during 2006-2010 when the quarterly migration rate
of homeowners fell by around 0.3 percentage points, and the fact that around one
third of homeowners were in negative equity during 2010, one can estimate that the
0.2 percentage point differential accounts for about 0.067 percentage points, or over
20% of the total decline in homeowner mobility during this time.
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Table 2.3: Baseline Results: All Workers
(1) (2)


















Not in labor force 0.006*** 0.006***
(0.001) (0.001)
Age35− 44 -0.003*** -0.003***
(0.001) (0.000)
Age45− 54 -0.006*** -0.006***
(0.000) (0.001)
High school -0.001** -0.002**
(0.001) (0.001)




Earn quartile 2 -0.001 -0.001
(0.001) (0.001)
Earn quartile 3 -0.007*** -0.007***
(0.001) (0.002)
Earn quartile 4 -0.006*** -0.006***
(0.001) (0.001)
N ˜7,300,000 ˜7,300,000
* p ≤ 0.05, ** p ≤ 0.01, *** p ≤ 0.001
Notes: Sample consists of approximately 7.3 million ACS individuals i, either household head or
spouse age 25-54, who are observed in one of 356 CBSAs j during a given quarter t in 2002q1-
2012q4. All regressions include the following sets of controls: Ownership status X CBSA, CBSA
X time period, Ownership status X time period (results omitted for clarity). Individual controls
for sex, age, race, education, marital status, presence of children, and residential tenure length are
also included. Standard errors are clustered by CBSA.
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Column 2 reports results from the specification using the log change in house
prices as the independent variable, and the coefficient on the key interaction term
is 0.005, also consistent with the lock-in hypothesis. For interpretation, recall from
Figure 2.6 that the mean total price appreciation of homeowners nationally fell to
about 25% in 2010, down from 50% in 2006. Thus, this 25 percentage point drop
can account for a decrease in the migration rate of about 0.125 percentage points,
which represents about 40% of the decline in the migration rate of homeowners
during this time. Note that this estimate represents an impact across the entire
spectrum of both positive and negative price changes, and not only on those with
negative equity, implying that the greater the increase in home equity the higher
the willingness to undertake a long-distance job move. This may reflect that the
threshold amount of equity required for moving differs by person, or that migration
generally becomes more attractive as wealth increases9.
Looking at the other coefficients in Table 2.3, we see that homeownership itself
lowers the probability of migrating, with a magnitude that is bit higher than on the
key interaction term but less statistically significant. In other words, homeowners
are simply less mobile naturally due to self-selection, as well as due to the influences
of changes in home equity. The home price variables themselves, however, do not
appear to have much common impact on owners and renters, with a coefficient of
essentially zero in Column 1 and a slightly negative coefficient in Column 2. This
means that rising prices due to changes in things such as amenity values make both
9A regression that includes both the negative equity proxy and the log change in house price
specification yields qualititatively similar results to the baseline, although the negative equity proxy
interaction loses its significance.
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owners and renters somewhat less likely to move away. Finally, as for the individual-
level characteristics, we see higher migration propensities for the unemployed and
lower earning workers, younger workers, males, the unmarried and those without
children, largely consistent with previous findings.
The large magnitudes of the estimates stand in contrast to much of the recent
literature, which typically have found little to no evidence of the lock-in effect.
However, my estimates fall in line with much of the earlier literature which found
that negative equity reduced household mobility by roughly 10-30% (Engelhart,
2003; Ferreira et al., 2011). Note also that no previous studies have employed
the same within-CBSA and time strategy used here, instead relying on broader
sources of variation. To see how different levels of variation affect the results, Table
2.4 shows estimates from the baseline negative equity specification by sequentially
adding different sets of control variables.
Table 2.4: Baseline Results: Impact of Controls
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Specification No Controls Add Individual Add CBSA Add CBSA*time
Covariates and time FE interactions
β/(s.e.) β/(s.e.) β/(s.e.) β/(s.e.)
Neg EquityXOwn -0.001 -0.000 0.001 -0.002***
(0.003) (0.000) (0.001) (0.001)
Notes: Sample consists of approximately 7.3 million ACS individuals i, either household head or
spouse age 25-54, who are observed in one of 356 CBSAs j during a given quarter t in 2002q1-
2012q4. The set of controls used differ by specification, as described in each column. Standard
errors are clustered by CBSA.
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Column 1 reports the results from a specification with no controls, and reveals
no relationship between the negative equity interaction and migration propensity.
Furthermore, adding individual controls in Column 2 does not notably change the
estimates. Thus, these specifications exploiting wide geographic variation in house
prices yield results similar to previous studies that are based on cross-CBSA or -state
comparisons. Column 3 shows the results from adding CBSA and time controls, and
interestingly we still fail to see any effect. In fact, it is only in Column 4, where
the CBSA*time interaction dummies are included, that we find the negative and
significant effect of negative equity on migration.
This discrepancy in results from using different sources of variation suggests
that local house prices and other local economic conditions that affect migration
are highly correlated across time, and even controlling for mean differences across
CBSAs is insufficient to distinguish between the two influences10. Thus, if negative
house price shocks are correlated with labor market shocks that disproportionately
depress the migration propensities of renters, this would mask the effect of lock-in
that owners are experiencing simultaneously. Given that the recession was par-
ticularly harmful to the disadvantaged socio-economic groups that also tend to be
renters, it is perhaps not surprising that their migration opportunities declined in a
way that aligned with the movement of local house prices11. Thus, only after sys-
tematically controlling for these labor market factors by including γjt can we isolate
10Abowd and Vilhuber (2012) find strong correlations between local house prices and labor
market conditions as measured by the Quarterly Workforce Indicators, even when including CBSA
and time fixed effects.
11Hoynes et al. (2012) find that the recession was most harmful to black, hispanic, young, and
less educated workers.
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the impact on owners and see a feature of the data that is not otherwise possible.
2.6.2 Effect on the Unemployed
2.6.2.1 Regression Estimates
While the above results suggest that the lock-in effect may prevent many work-
ers from making efficient job transitions, it could have an even more harmful effect
on the unemployed, since their unemployment spells may potentially be prolonged
due to their inability to move. Economists have long noted a link between home-
ownership and unemployment, as first suggested by Oswald (1997). This hypothesis
that homeownership impedes the return to labor market equilibrium after shocks is
supported by certain features of the data. An example, pictured in Figure 2.9, plots
the ratio of the unemployment rate of homeowners to that of renters using monthly
CPS data from 1990-2010, and it seen that this ratio increases during recessions
and especially the most recent recession. Due to these reasons, commentators have
expressed concerns that the effects of lock-in may disproportionately hit distressed
areas that have experienced declines in both their housing and labor markets, con-
tributing to unemployment persistence and a slower economic recovery.
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1990m1 1995m1 2000m1 2005m1 2010m1
date
Recessions UR Owner/UR Renter
To address this question of whether lock-in affects the mobility of the unem-
ployed in particular, I repeat the within-CBSA-time test on the subset of individuals
that the ACS classifies as being unemployed, which can be compared to results from
subsamples of employed workers, and of those not in the labor force. The ACS con-
tains an employment status variable, which codes an individual as unemployed if
they report not having a job, but being available for and actively seeking work.
Results in Table 2.5 fail to show support for the lock-in phenomenon affecting
the labor mobility of the unemployed. Column 1 shows that the negative equity
interaction does not affect the out-migration rate of unemployed homeowners in a
statistically significant way. Similarly, there is no significant impact on those who
are labeled as not being in the labor force. The lack of significance may perhaps
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be attributable to the fact that the respective subsamples of unemployed and non-
participants represent a fairly small fraction of the entire population, which is further
exacerbated by the fact that the negative equity proxy is a binary variable that is
also of relatively low frequency. The change in house price specification also shows no
impact for the unemployed in Column 4, although it yields a marginally significant
and positive coefficient for those not in the labor force in Column 5. Note that the
observed variation in the log change in house price variable is greater than in the
discrete negative equity proxy, perhaps affording greater precision.
Table 2.5: Results by Employment Status
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
House Price measure Neg equity Neg equity Neg equity ∆ln(HPI) ∆ln(HPI) ∆ln(HPI)
Subsample Unemp. Not in L.F. Emp. Unemp. Not in L.F. Emp.
β/(s.e.) β/(s.e.) β/(s.e.) β/(s.e.) β/(s.e.) β/(s.e.)
HousePriceXOwn 0.002 -0.000 -0.002*** 0.002 0.004* 0.005***
(0.003) (0.001) (0.001) (0.004) (0.002) (0.001)
Own -0.030* -0.006 -0.006** 0.030* -0.008 0.009***
(0.010) (0.008) (0.002) (0.012) (0.008) (0.02)
HousePrice -0.001 -0.001 -0.000 -0.007* -0.002 -0.001
(0.002) (0.001) (0.000) (0.003) (0.002) (0.001)
N ˜300,000 ˜900,000 ˜6,100,000 ˜300,000 ˜900,000 ˜6,100,000
* p ≤ 0.05 , ** p ≤ 0.01, *** p ≤ 0.001
Notes: Sample consists of approximately 7.3 million ACS individuals i, either household head or
spouse age 25-54, who are observed in one of 356 CBSAs j during a given quarter t in 2002q1-
2012q4. All regressions include the following sets of controls: Ownership status X CBSA, CBSA
X time period, Ownership status X time period. Individual controls for sex, age, race, education,
marital status, presence of children, and residential tenure length are also included. Standard
errors are clustered by CBSA.
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Given the nature of the migration decision for the unemployed, it is arguably
more appropriate to use a concept of migration that allows for a longer timing thresh-
old. Since migrating job seekers may move before engaging in a job search, requiring
that they be observed as employed within 1 quarter is perhaps too restrictive. Ex-
tending the threshold has the additional benefit of observing more migrators, which
may alleviate some of the imprecision due to sparsely populated CBSA-time cells.
Table 2.6 shows results for the unemployed using the 4-quarter threshold definition
migration. We see that results are now significant at the 5% level in both specifica-
tions, with a coefficient of -0.6 in the negtive equity specification in Column 1, and
0.8 in the ∆ln(HPI) specification in Column 2. Given an average 4-qtr migration
rate of around 10% for unemployed homeowners in the sample, this implies that the
lock-in effect makes unemployed homeowners 8% less likely to migrate than average.
This effect is smaller than the estimated 12% decrease for the entire sample. This
diminished impact of lock-in perhaps reflects the increased incentives to relocate for
the jobless, who may stand to gain more by moving than a migrator who is simply
looking to switch jobs. Additionally, unemployed individuals face an increased risk
of foreclosure as they may not have the necessary liquidity to continue to pay their
mortgage. Both of these factors would serve to mitigate the lock-in effect, and help
explain why the estimates are lower in magnitude for the unemployed.
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Table 2.6: Unemployed Sample: 4-qtr Migration Threshold
(1) (2)









* p ≤ 0.05, ** p ≤ 0.01, *** p ≤ 0.001
Notes: Sample consists of approximately 7.3 million ACS individuals i, either household head or
spouse age 25-54, who are observed in one of 356 CBSAs j during a given quarter t in 2002q1-
2012q4. All regressions include the following sets of controls: Ownership status X CBSA, CBSA
X time period, Ownership status X time period. Individual controls for sex, age, race, education,
marital status, presence of children, and residential tenure length are also included. Standard
errors are clustered by CBSA.
2.6.2.2 Impact on the Unemployment Rate
Using this point estimate from the unemployed sample in the 4-quarter migra-
tion specification, we can conduct a back-of-the-envelope calculation to estimate the
impact of housing lock-in on the national unemployment rate. In the context of the
canonical search and matching model framework developed by Diamond, Mortensen
and Pissarides, Shimer (2007) states that the steady state unemployment rate can





where f is the job finding rate for the unemployed, and s is the rate of separation to
unemployment for the employed. Therefore, assuming a constant separation rate s,
the impact of housing lock-in on the equilibrium unemployment rate is a function of
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the difference between f and fc, the counterfactual finding rate that would prevail







In my data, the probability of an unemployed worker becoming re-employed within
a year is 64%, with 52% finding a job within the same CBSA and 12% in a different
CBSA. This is roughly consistent with estimates of the annual finding rate in the
CPS as calculated by Cajner and Ratner (2014). Therefore, the estimated 8%
reduction in the migration propensity for unemployed homeowners with negative
equity implies a reduction in the annual job finding rate of about 1 percentage point
for this group (assuming no difference in the finding rate in their original CBSA).
However, since underwater homeowners only represent about one quarter of the
unemployed in my sample at the depths of the market in 2010, this reduction in the
job finding rate translates to only about a 0.25 percentage point reduction in the
finding rate on an annual basis. The flow from employment to unemployment cannot
be directly observed in my data set, but estimates from the CPS for the annual
separation rate during the recession period of 2007-2009 is about 7%. Entering
these numbers into the above equation results in an increase of the unemployment
rate of less than a tenth of a percentage point. Therefore, even if lock-in does inhibit
some unemployed individuals from relocating, it is not of a significant magnitude to
affect the unemployment rate in a substantial way.
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2.6.3 Robustness Analysis
2.6.3.1 Alternate Dependent Variables
For the sake of assessing the robustness of the above results, we will first explore
using alternate definitions of the migration outcome. Table 2.7 shows results using
the 2-quarter as well as the 4-qtr threshhold of migration, which allow for a longer
job search process, intervening spell of unobserved unemployment, or employment
at a job not covered by the LEHD system.
Table 2.7: Alternate Migration Thresholds
2-qtr Threshold 4-qtr Threshold
(1) (2) (3) (4)
House Price measure Neg equity ∆ln(HPI) Neg equity ∆ln(HPI)
β/(s.e.) β/(s.e.) β/(s.e.) β/(s.e.)
HousePriceXOwn -0.003*** 0.006*** -0.004*** 0.008***
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.002)
Own -0.008** -0.010*** -0.008** -0.011***
(0.002)** (0.002) (0.003) (0.003)
HousePrice 0.001 -0.002* 0.001 -0.003*
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
N ˜7,300,000 ˜7,300,000 ˜7,300,000 ˜7,300,000
* p ≤ 0.05, ** p ≤ 0.01, *** p ≤ 0.001
Notes: Sample consists of approximately 7.3 million ACS individuals i, either household head or
spouse age 25-54, who are observed in one of 356 CBSAs j during a given quarter t in 2002q1-
2012q4. All regressions include the following sets of controls: Ownership status X CBSA, CBSA
X time period, Ownership status X time period. Individual controls for sex, age, race, education,
marital status, presence of children, and residential tenure length are also included. Standard
errors are clustered by CBSA.
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The coefficient on the key interaction term for the 2-qtr migration threshold in
column 1 is -0.3, while the corresponding coefficient in the 4-qtr specification is -0.4.
Compared to the mean 2-quarter and 4-quarter migration rates for homeowners of
2.6 and 3.1 percent respectively, the implied changes in migration propensity due to
negative equity are reduced by about 10-15% on average, similar to the previously
shown estimates based on 1-quarter migration. Coefficients in the specifications
using the log change of house prices are positive and significant, and also have
similar implied magnitudes to previous results.
2.6.3.2 Differences in LEHD coverage
Because my measure of migration is based on the propensity of observing ACS
individuals in the LEHD database, it is necessary to consider whether differences
in workers’ a priori probabilities of being observed could be influencing the results.
First, due to the varying geographic coverage of the LEHD universe over time, we
explore whether the results would differ if the baseline regression were run instead
on a consistent sample of states. Using the measure of migration based on the 45
states present in the LEHD system as of 2002:Q1, as discussed above, Table 2.8
shows the results from such an analysis.
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Table 2.8: Consistent 45-State Sample
(1) (2)









* p ≤ 0.05, ** p ≤ 0.01, *** p ≤ 0.001
Notes: Sample consists of approximately 6.8 million ACS individuals i, either household head
or spouse age 25-54, who are observed in CBSA j during a given quarter t in 2002q1-2012q4.
Sample is limited to 45 states that are present in the LEHD system as of 2002q1, and definition
of migration is altered to include only those states as destinations. All regressions include the
following sets of controls: Ownership status X CBSA, CBSA X time period, Ownership status X
time period. Individual controls for sex, age, race, education, marital status, presence of children,
and residential tenure length are also included. Standard errors are clustered by CBSA.
The point estimates of -.002 in the negative equity specification and .005 in
the percentage change in house prices specification match those from using the
complete sample, although the significance declines slightly in the negative equity
specification, likely due to the lower number of observations. The overall similarity
of these results, however, alleviates concerns that any bias is arising from the varying
geographic coverage in the baseline sample.
A second coverage issue arises from the fact that certain types of individuals
may be more or less likely to be accurately captured in the data. Not only are
there classes of workers that are absent from the LEHD database, such as the self-
employed, but there may also be unobserved characteristics that lead to a greater
probability of being mismeasured. Previous research has shown that survey data
do not always correspond to the administrative data in the LEHD system, and the
74
reasons for such discrepancies are unclear (Abraham et al., 2009). Thus, combining
survey and administrative data could create bias if the geographic and temporal
distribution of mismeasured workers varies in such a way that is correlated with
housing-related factors. To address this, I run the analysis on a subsample of in-
dividuals that are verified as having an LEHD job in the same reference quarter
and CBSA of their ACS response, and who thus who demonstrate a tendency to
be covered accurately by the LEHD universe. The fraction of such confirmed jobs
in the sample is approximately 70%. Table 2.9 reports results from a subsample of
“confirmed” jobs, compared to a subsample of those whose employment status in
time t is “unconfirmed”. In fact, we see that the lock-in effect is more pronounced
in the confirmed cases than the unconfirmed cases, with coefficients on the negative
equity interaction of -.003 compared to -.001, both significant at the 1% level. The
same pattern is seen in results from the log change in house price specification. Thus
while we have no specific reason to discount the unconfirmed cases, it is encouraging
that the baseline results are being driven by the data points that display consistency
between the two underlying sources.
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Table 2.9: Sample by Whether Reference Job is LEHD-Confirmed
(1) (2) (3) (4)
House Price measure Neg equity Neg equity ∆ln(HPI) ∆ln(HPI)
Subsample Confirmed Unconfirmed Confirmed Unconfirmed
β/(s.e.) β/(s.e.) β/(s.e.) β/(s.e.)
HousePriceXOwn -0.003** -.001** 0.010*** 0.002***
(0.001) (0.000) (0.002) (0.001)
Own -.017** -0.003 -0.020*** -0.001
(0.005) (0.002) (0.005) (0.0031)
HousePrice -0.000 0.001 -0.002 -0.004
(0.001) (0.000) (0.002) (0.002)
N ˜5,200,000 ˜2,100,000 ˜5,200,000 ˜2,100,000
* p ≤ 0.05, ** p ≤ 0.01, *** p ≤ 0.001
Notes: Sample consists of approximately 7.3 million ACS individuals i, either household head or
spouse age 25-54, who are observed in one of 356 CBSAs j during a given quarter t in 2002q1-
2012q4. All regressions include the following sets of controls: Ownership status X CBSA, CBSA
X time period, Ownership status X time period (results omitted for clarity). Individual controls
for sex, age, race, education, marital status, presence of children, and residential tenure length are
also included. Standard errors are clustered by CBSA
2.6.3.3 Demographic Heterogeneity
Given the design of the empirical framework, a key threat to identification
would arise if house prices were proxying for something that has heterogeneous
effects on the owner and renter groups. In particular, we may be worried that such
unobserved factors will differentially influence people with different demographic
characteristics. Given the very different compositions of the owner and renter pools,
such an unobserved influence may be driving the different sensitivities to house prices
of the two groups. Differences in their mean migration propensities by CBSA across
time, as well as by time period nationally, are already accounted for with the existing
controls. Thus this bias would only occur if the within-CBSA house price variation
is correlated with other factors that may be affecting the migration propensities of
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certain groups of people across time.
In order to address these concerns about heterogeneous effects, Table 2.10
shows the results from re-estimating the baseline regression model on a variety of
demographic subsamples. These specifications therefore represent full interactions
between the homeownership and house price variables and the given demographic
traits that may capture this heterogeneity. If the results remain fairly consistent
across subsamples, this provides more reassurance that heterogeneous effects are
not driving the baseline results.
Table 2.10: Coefficients for Demographic Subsamples
1) Sex Male Female
Neg Equity -.003*** -.001
∆ln(HPI) .006*** .005***
2) Age 25-34 35-44 45-54
Neg Equity -.002* -.002* -.001
∆ln(HPI) .008*** .003** .002
3) Race White Non-white
Neg Equity -.002*** -.002*
∆ln(HPI) .006*** .005***
4) Earnings 1st Quartile 2nd Quartile 3rd Quartile 4th Quartile
Neg Equity .001 -.001 -.002* -.002**
∆ln(HPI) .005* .004* .005** .004***
5) Marital status Married Unmarried
Neg Equity -.003** -.002***
∆ln(HPI) .005*** .006***
6) Children present Children No children
Neg Equity -.001* -.003***
∆ln(HPI) .003** .007***
7) Education < Highschool HS Diploma Some College College+
Neg Equity .001 -.001 -.002* -.002*
∆ln(HPI) -.002 .003 .006*** .006***
* p ≤ 0.05, ** p ≤ 0.01, *** p ≤ 0.001
Notes: Sample consists of approximately 7.3 million ACS individuals i, either household head or
spouse age 25-54, who are observed in one of 356 CBSAs j during a given quarter t in 2002q1-
2012q4. All regressions include the following sets of controls: Ownership status X CBSA, CBSA
X time period, Ownership status X time period. Individual controls for sex, age, race, education,
marital status, presence of children, and residential tenure length are also included. Standard
errors are clustered by CBSA.
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The first panel of Table 2.10 estimates the model for males and females sepa-
rately. The signs of the coefficients on the negative equity interaction are negative
for both groups in columns 1 and 2, although the estimate is somewhat lower and
statistically insignificant for females. However, the results using the log change in
house price in columns 3 and 4 show strongly significant results for both males and
females, and of a similar magnitude.
Panel 2 shows results from the three age categories, 21-34, 35-44, and 45-54.
The results from the negative equity specification yield coefficients on the interaction
term that are similar across groups and consistent with the baseline results, although
the estimate for the 45-54 age category is not significant. The log change in house
price specifications all yield positive coefficients, although of a somewhat higher
magnitude for the youngest age group, and statistically insignificant for the oldest
age category. Note that by splitting the sample into three or more subsamples, the
lower number of observations does not afford the same precision as by using the
entire sample, so more variability in the estimates is to be expected12.
Estimates for whites and non-whites are shown in Panel 3 of the table. Here
we see virtually identical point estimates across both specifications, although the
negative equity specification yields slightly less significant estimates for the non-
white group.
The results for the four earnings quartiles, shown in panel 4, reveal less pre-
cisely estimated coefficients due to the relatively small sample sizes, although all
12For complete regression results for these demographic subsamples, including standard errors,
additional coefficients, and subsample sizes, please see Appendix A.
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but 2 of the 8 specifications are at least significant at the 5% level. In Column 1 we
see for the first time a coefficient of a sign contrary to the baseline results, but it is
only very slightly positive and not statistically significant.
Panel 5 shows the results by marital status. The coefficients are very similar
between the two categories, and comparable to baseline estimates. Some differences
appear in the results based on the presence of children in the household, seen in
Panel 6, as the lock-in effect appears to be stronger for those without children.
Finally, Panel 7 divides the sample by education level: less than high school,
high school graduates, some college, and college graduates. Results are quite con-
sistent across groups, although the coefficient is slightly positive and insignificant
for the “less than high school” group in the negative equity specification, although
note that this category contains the fewest observations. Across both specifications,
the effect appears to be strongest for the more highly educated workers.
Across this wide set of demographic subsamples, the signs of the coefficients
of interest have been of the same sign as in the baseline results in all but two cases.
In addition, the magnitudes have generally been close to the baseline estimates of
-0.002 in the negative equity specifications and 0.005 in the log change of house price
specifications. Therefore taken as a whole, given the absence of widespread anoma-
lies or outliers, these results show no particular cause for concern that heterogeneous
effects on demographic groups may be confounding the baseline estimates.
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2.6.3.4 Geographic Subsamples
Next we extend the analysis to additional subsamples based on geography,
both in order to test for robustness as well as to explore some aspects of the lock-in
phenomenon that may differ across areas for various reasons. First, we will test
whether the strength of the lock-in effect differs across regions of the country which
experienced the fall of house prices differently. Next, we explore whether the impact
varied depending on whether individuals lived in states that prevented lenders from
suing those who foreclosed for outstanding debt, a protection called “non-recourse”
status. Finally, we will see if the lock-in effect exhibits differences in states with
high rates of negative equity (and foreclosure) compared to those with lower negative
equity rates.
While house prices declined across the country, some areas experienced the
crash more strongly than others. While many notable examples occured in the
cases of certain cities and states, such as Las Vegas and Arizona, these areas are too
small to study with this within-CBSA methodology. However, there was significant
house price variation across Census regions as well, and Table 2.11 shows the results



































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































In the negative equity specifications in Columns 1-4, the magnitude of the
key coefficient is highest for the Northeast and West, and lowest for the Midwest.
This may suggest that the incentives to move away from the Rust-belt cities that
were hit hardest by the recession, such as Detroit, overwhelmed the effects of lock-
in. However, the log change in house price specifications in Columns 5-8 reveal
the opposite pattern with the Midwest actually displaying the strongest lock-in
effects, albeit somewhat imprecisely estimated. This implies that there may be
non-linearities in the effects of changes in home equity.
Next we turn to a comparison of recourse vs. non-recourse states. As men-
tioned above, a non-recourse state is one in which the laws prevent mortgage lenders
from suing a foreclosed homeowner for the difference between the proceeds of the
foreclosure sale and the outstanding debt. Conversely, in recourse states lenders are
allowed to seek redress in court, known as “deficiency judgements”13. In practice,
however, such lawsuits have been rare, so it is unclear whether living in a recourse
state substantially affects the incentives of underwater homeowners seeking to relo-
cate. Table 2.12 shows that the coefficient for recourse states is indeed somewhat
higher in magnitude in the negative equity specification, suggesting that recourse
laws may be exacerbating the lock-in effect. However, the coefficients are identical
in the log change of house price specification, although note that the recourse laws
do not affect those with positive equity and therefore this specification may be less
relevant than the specification that more closely identifies the at-risk group.
13The list of states with non-recourse laws are: Alaska, Arizona, California, Connecticut, Idaho,
Minnesota, North Carolina, North Dakota, Oregon, Texas, Utah and Washington. The remainder
are recourse states.
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Table 2.12: Results by State Recourse Status
(1) (2) (3) (4)
House Price measure Neg equity Neg equity ∆ln(HPI) ∆ln(HPI)
Subsample Recourse Non-Recourse Recourse Non-Recourse
β/(s.e.) β/(s.e.) β/(s.e.) β/(s.e.)
HousePriceXOwn -0.003*** -0.001* 0.005*** 0.005***
(0.001) (0.001) (0.002) (0.001)
Own -0.002 -0.008* -.004 -0.009**
(0.003) (0.0013) (0.003) (0.003)
HousePrice 0.001 -0.000 -0.002* -0.003**
(0.001) (0.0001) (0.001) (0.001)
N ˜2,400,000 ˜4,900,000 ˜2,400,000 ˜4,900,000
* p ≤ 0.05, ** p ≤ 0.01, *** p ≤ 0.001
Notes: Sample consists of approximately 7.3 million ACS individuals i, either household head or
spouse age 25-54, who are observed in one of 356 CBSAs j during a given quarter t in 2002q1-
2012q4. All regressions include the following sets of controls: Ownership status X CBSA, CBSA
X time period, Ownership status X time period. Individual controls for sex, age, race, education,
marital status, presence of children, and residential tenure length are also included. Standard
errors are clustered by CBSA.
Finally, Table 2.13 divides the sample by state-level negative equity rates.
Specifically, using data from the Core Logic Negative Equity Report from 2010:Q4,
each state is placed in “low”, “medium” and “high” groups, where the cutoff levels
for low and high are set at 30% and 15% respectively14. Again, the a priori effect of
living in a high negative equity state compared to a low negative equity state is not
clear. On one hand we might expect that since the high negative equity states are
the ones hit hardest by the housing crisis, the lock-in effect is likely to be stronger.
On the other hand, because high negative equity rates are accompanied by high
rates of foreclosure, and because out-migrating from these most distressed areas
may yield the largest benefit, it may be that the lock-in effect is in fact weaker in
those areas. The estimates, however, do not show any substantial differences across
14High Group: Nevada, Arizona, Florida, Michigan and California. Medium Group: Georgia,
Virginia, Maryland, Ohio, Idaho, Colorado, New Hampshire, Illinois, Utah, Rhode Island, District
of Columbia, Massachusetts, Minnesota and New Jersey. Low Group: All other states.
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these groups of states, either suggesting that there is no differential effect, or that
the factors described above roughly offset one another.
Table 2.13: Results by State-Level Negative Equity Rate
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
House Price measure Neg equity Neg equity Neg equity ∆ln(HPI) ∆ln(HPI) ∆ln(HPI)
Subsample High Medium Low High Medium Low
β/(s.e.) β/(s.e.) β/(s.e.) β/(s.e.) β/(s.e.) β/(s.e.)
HousePriceXOwn -0.002 -0.001 -0.002** 0.005** 0.006*** 0.006*
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.003)
Own -0.032 -0.004 -0.001 -0.033*** -0.007* -0.006
(0.006) (0.002) (0.002) (0.006) (0.003) (0.003)
HousePrice -0.000 0.000** 0.002 -0.002 -0.003* -0.003
(0.001) (0.001) (0.004) (0.001) (0.001) (0.002)
N ˜1,900,000 ˜2,100,000 ˜3,300,000 ˜1,900,000 ˜2,100,000 ˜3,300,000
* p ≤ 0.05, ** p ≤ 0.01, *** p ≤ 0.001
Notes: Sample consists of approximately 7.3 million ACS individuals i, either household head or
spouse age 25-54, who are observed in one of 356 CBSAs j during a given quarter t in 2002q1-
2012q4. All regressions include the following sets of controls: Ownership status X CBSA, CBSA
X time period, Ownership status X time period. Individual controls for sex, age, race, education,
marital status, presence of children, and residential tenure length are also included. Standard
errors are clustered by CBSA.
2.7 Conclusion
This study has employed a novel method of measuring the impact of house
price changes on the out-migration propensity of homeowners, by comparing the
effects on owners and renters in the same location and time period. Results from
the within-CBSA and time analysis reveal that the migration propensity of home-
owners is strongly affected by changes in house prices. Specifically, homeowners who
have experienced nominal declines in the value of their homes since moving in have
migration rates that are 0.2 percentage points lower than comparable homeowners
who have not experienced such a decline. This represents a figure that is 12% lower
than the sample average for homeowners, and accounts for approximately 20% of the
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decrease in the overall decline in the mobility of homeowners from 2006-2010. The
total percent change in house prices also appears to significantly affect migration
propensity, suggesting that changes in equity matter for mobility on the positive as
well as negative ends of the spectrum.
The effect of lock-in is less apparent for the unemployed, however, which in
some ways may be the group for whom hindered mobility is the most harmful.
This could partially be due to the small size of the sample of unemployed, which
limits the precision of the estimates. It is also possible that the unemployed are less
influenced by lock-in because of higher rates of foreclosure and increased incentives to
relocate for work. However, further study is warranted to confirm that lock-in is not
representing a significant friction for this group of workers. For example, it could be
most worthwhile to investigate particularly distressed regions and industries, where
the susceptibility of workers to lock-in would be particularly detrimental to economic
recovery.
Nevertheless, taken as a whole, these results suggest that lock-in has a signifi-
cant effect on national worker flows, and hence on the economy-wide reallocation of
labor. The decline in labor flows in general has been a widely noted phenomenon as
of late, and researchers have posited many potential consequences for labor market
search, wage increases, and even output and productivity growth (Davis and Halti-
wanger, 2014; Hyatt and Spletzer, 2014; Molloy and Wozniak, 2011). Investigating
the causes of this decline will surely continue to be a much researched topic, and this
study provides an example of how combining different sources of data can provide
a valuable tool for exploring these complex labor market interactions.
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Chapter 3: Unemployment Duration and Geographic Mobility: Do
Movers Fare Better than Stayers?
3.1 Introduction
The ability to relocate to a different labor market has long been viewed as
an important means by which the unemployed can improve their job search and
escape unemployment more quickly. This issue was highlighted during the Great
Recession, which was accompanied by a dramatic and well-documented decline in
internal migration. While much of this decline was likely due to the lack of employ-
ment opportunities in general, researchers have argued that other factors such as
a declining housing market further deterred unemployed workers from leaving the
most distressed labor markets and thus prolonged the economic recovery. Implicit in
these discussions, however, is the assumption that workers who move are better off
for having done so, yet in fact there is scant empirical evidence that this is the case.
While many models have focused on how migration helps effectuate equilibrium
in unemployment rates and wages across regions, fewer studies have investigated
whether the individual outcomes of the actual migrators are better than if they had
remained in their original labor market. Thus, the literature is largely unsettled on
whether migration by the unemployed is “micro-efficient”, in the sense that every
individual actor increases their utility, as discussed by Herzog et. al. (1993).
The migration literature has generally focused on measuring the influence of
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various factors in the migration decision, with DaVanzo (1978) being the first to
focus on unemployment as a key determinant, providing evidence that the unem-
ployed move at much higher rates than the average worker. Macroeconomic theories
developed describing this phenomenon as the shifting of resources away from the less
productive, high unemployment areas, to the more productive, low unemployment
areas (Greenwood, 1975; Molho, 1986). Structural models of migration and unem-
ployment followed, such as Harris and Todaro (1970), Sato (2004), Rogerson and
McKinnon (2005) and Zenou (2009), describing how the interaction of unemploy-
ment and wages leads to equilibrium locational placement of workers.
Less attention has been paid, however, to the actual outcomes of the individual
workers who move, especially in comparison to how they could have expected to
fare by remaining in the same location. Finding evidence of the individual benefits
of moving is important, since it is primarily through this incentive mechanism that
equilibrium in the labor market can be achieved. Kennan and Walker (2011) employ
a structural estimation using the NLSY, and show that workers’ migration decisions
are consistent with the maximization of lifetime wages, but the model does not
focus on the short-term outcomes that may motivate the unemployed in particular.
Those studies that do concentrate on the jobless population have generally failed to
show much evidence of improved outcomes from relocating, with some even finding
migration to have harmful effects on future outcomes. Both Shumway (1993) and
Bailey (1994), using the SIPP and NLSY respectively, find that workers who migrate
have somewhat longer spells of unemployment on average, although these studies are
unable to rigorously address the endogenous selection into migration. Pekkala and
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Tervo (2002) study unemployed workers in Finland and find that the employment
rate of movers was much lower than that of stayers after the issue of self-selection into
migration was controlled for. This study addresses the endogenous selection issue
with an instrumental variables method using regional house prices as instruments
for migration, a strategy that I will follow here.
In this study, I use a large sample of unemployed workers in the American
Community Survey, combined with information about their employment outcomes
from the Longitudinal Employer-Household Dynamics (LEHD) database, in order
to measure the difference in re-employment propensities between those who move
to another metropolitan area for a new job, and those who become employed in the
same location as originally observed. To address the biases associated with selection
into migration, I use information on local house price changes since each individual
moved into his or her home, which should influence their migration decision but not
be correlated with employability in general. Results from two-stage instrumental
variables analyses show that those who move for new jobs become re-employed
within a shorter time frame, a feature of the data that is not evident in more simple
comparisons. These results imply that those who select into migration are relatively
disadvantaged in terms of their ability to find work compared to those who stay,
and stand to gain the most by relocating.
The discussion proceeds as follows. Section 2 describes the data and the
method for measuring labor migration and unemployment spells. Section 3 discusses
the empirical strategy, and motivates the use of house prices as an instrumental
variable. Section 4 reports the results, which estimate the impact of migrating for
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a new job on the time to re-employment. Section 4 concludes.
3.2 Measuring Migration and Time to Re-employment
An unemployed individual residing in a particular location faces a decision
whether to remain in the same labor market to find new employment, or else to
relocate to another labor market. Analyzing these outcomes thus requires longitu-
dinal data that allows us to observe an unemployed worker at time t in their original
location j, and follow the individual until they find subsequent employment at time
t + k, in either location j or another location −j.
To this end, I employ the combined ACS-LEHD dataset described in detail in
Chapter 2. The large size of the sample is advantageous for this analysis, because
the data sources more typically used to study migration, such as the NLSY, CPS,
and SIPP, do not allow enough observations of unemployed people to generate very
precise estimates for this group. By merging in the employment histories of these
same individuals from the LEHD database, I can measure labor mobility amongst
the ACS respondents and exploit the variation that the large sample affords1.
The sample comprises all respondents i (reference person or spouse) aged 25-
54 and residing in one of 356 CBSAs during any quarter t of the period 2002-2012,
who are labeled as unemployed according to ACS definitions, and who also have
no observed earnings in the LEHD database during quarter t. Note that because
the ACS data is monthly and the LEHD data is quarterly, the restriction that the
individual have no LEHD earnings during the entire quarter is more restrictive than
1See Chapter 2 for further details on the construction of this combined ACS-LEHD data set
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the requirement that the respondent be labeled as unemployed during the month
of the ACS interview. Approximately two-thirds of the unemployed in the ACS
meet this restriction of zero LEHD earnings in t. Note that LEHD coverage varied
geographically over the sample period, as more states began to participate during
the middle part of the decade.2 Thus I do not include in the sample any individual
who is observed in the ACS during a time when their state of residence is not part
of the LEHD data.
As before, these individuals are matched to their employment histories in the
LEHD database at all UI-covered jobs through 2014q3. To determine when an ACS
respondent unemployed at time t eventually becomes re-employed, I search for the
first new LEHD job to begin after the observed date of unemployment. The next
job with positive earnings beginning in a quarter t + k is determined to be the
new job. In case of multiple new jobs starting in the same quarter, the one with
the greatest earnings is selected (i.e. the “dominant” job). Since a new job in a
different CBSA may theoretically be accompanied by another new job beginning in
the original CBSA, the concept of migration is somewhat clouded in this case, but
the focus on the dominant job is meant to capture the most economically meaningful
employment outcome.
The location of the job is given by the LEHD-assigned geographical informa-
tion for the employer establishment, according to QCEW sources, thus allowing us
to determine whether the new job is located in the same CBSA as reference CBSA
2As mentioned in Chapter 2, 45 states are covered at the beginning of the sample in 2002, 48
states by 2004, and 50 states plus D.C. by 2010.
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j, or else in a different CBSA −j. Moving to a job located in an adjacent CBSA
that is considered to be part of the same “Combined Statistical Area”, or else to
a rural area in the same state as j, is not counted as a move. As described in the
previous chapter, the LEHD database imputes a worker’s workplace establishment
in the case where their employer has multiple establishments. This introduces error
in my measurement of migration, although note that the LEHD imputation system
is largely based on the proximity of the worker’s residence to the employer estab-
lishment. This mitigates concerns that migration will be spuriously observed due to
the imputation process.
The time to re-employment is defined as the number of quarters k between the
observed reference period of unemployment t in the ACS survey, and the first quarter
of subsequent employment in the LEHD data t+k. Note that the true beginning of
the unemployment spell is not observed, because the ACS survey does not indicate
when the period of unemployment actually started. While this means that the length
of unemployment spells will be underestimated, assuming that the ACS interview
occurs at a random point during an individual’s unemployment spell, there is little
concern that certain observations will be systematically more mis-measured than
others. Also, because I do not observe jobs that are not covered by the LEHD
universe, the end of unemployment spells may also be measured with error. The
LEHD data were available through 2014q3 at the time of this analysis, therefore
spells not completed by this time are right-censored.
Finally, because the definition of migration is based on employment and not
place of residence, only completed unemployment spells will be included in the analy-
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sis. Therefore, the estimated effects of moving on re-employment will be conditional
on eventual re-employment. This leads to a somewhat different interpretation com-
pared to a study based on residential mobility, which can determine if an individual
migrated regardless of whether he or she found employment. Such an analyis is a
more direct test of whether moving is a mechanism that leads to employment, in the
sense that moving can be viewed as a treatment (once selection is controlled for).
However, my analysis offers a test of whether those who move and find employment
appear to be doing so in a way that is consistent with the incentives to shorten
their unemployment spell. As there has heretofor been little evidence that moving
is beneficial for the individual actors, even such a narrowly tailored question is worth
exploring.
Table 3.1 displays summary measures of re-employment in my sample, both for
those who become employed in the same CBSA j as their residence in the original
ACS reference period t (“stayers”), as well as for those who become re-employed in
a different CBSA −j (“movers”). Of the approximately 224,000 individuals in the
sample of unemployed, 68% are observed becoming subsequently employed at a new
job before the end of the sample in 2014q3. Due to right-censoring, the probability
of observing re-employment is lower for those who are observed in the later years of
the reference period 2002-2012, but note that yearly controls will be included in the
main analysis to account for these differences.
Approximately 51.3% of the sample is next observed working in the same
CBSA j as their ACS residence, while another 16% are next employed in a different
CBSA −j. Consistent with previous findings, the average length of time to re-
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Table 3.1: Re-Employment Statistics for ACS Sample of Unemployed
Variable Mover Stayer All Re-employed
Fraction re-employed within 1 qtr. 0.044 0.155 0.199
Fraction re-employed within 2 qtrs. 0.070 0.240 0.310
Fraction re-employed within 4 qtrs. 0.102 0.341 0.443
Fraction re-employed by end of sample 0.166 0.513 0.679
Mean Time to Re-employment (qtrs.) 5.236 4.709 4.837
N ˜224,000
employment is slightly longer for movers than for stayers, with average times to re-
employment of about 5.2 quarters to 4.7 quarters respectively. The re-employment
rate within 1 quarter is about 20% overall. Conditional on eventual re-employment,
about 30% of stayers find jobs within the 1-quarter time frame, compared to about
25% of movers. This somewhat higher re-employment success rate for stayers also
holds true for the 2-quarter and 4-quarter thresholds. Note that because of the
above restrictions this sample represents a set of the long-term unemployed, therefore
the re-employment propensities are lower than typically seen in the unemployment
literature. However, the rise of the long-term unemployed was one of the dominant
features of the Great Recession, and it is reasonable to believe that this is a group
for whom the decision to move is particularly relevant3.
While the focus of the analysis is on the individual benefits from relocating
for employment, we will begin by investigating whether the aggregate out-migration
propensities in our data appear to be related to external factors like local labor mar-
ket conditions. Many empirical studies have noted a positive relationship between
local unemployment rates and out-migration propensities, such as Basker (2003),
3As noted by Lawrence Katz in testimony before the Joint Economic Committee of Congress,
April 2010.
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Nakosteen et. al. (2008) and Haurin and Haurin (1998). To confirm this feature of
the data in my sample, Table 3.2 calculates the observed out-migration rate for four
categories of CBSAs, grouped by their average unemployment rate in 2009 according
to CBSA-level data from the Bureau of Labor Statistics 4.
Table 3.2: Out-Migration by CBSA-Level Unemployment Rate: 2009





The four bins are centered around the approximate national unemployment
rate of 10%. We see that the out-migration rates monotonically increase across the
unemployment rate categories, implying that the labor markets that were most dis-
tressed during the Great Recession also experienced higher rates of out-migration.
Indeed, out-migration from areas with unemployment rates exceeding 11% was 1.5
times greater than from areas with unemployment under 9%. These findings are
consistent with the empirical and theoretical litereature, which highlight the role of
migration in restoring equilibrium between labor markets during economic down-
turns.
3.3 Estimating the Impact of Migration on Re-employment
The central question of this study is whether out-migration for new employ-
ment shortens the time to re-employment. Clearly, the length of one’s unemploy-
4Local Area Unemployment Statistics (http://www.bls.gov/lau/).
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ment spell is not the only factor that an individual takes into account when deciding
whether to move, but the notion that the unemployed make their locational choice
based on their perceived chances of re-employment is common in the literature (Da-
Vanzo, 1978; Herzog and Schlottmann, 1981). Indeed, while locational choice may
well be influenced by long-term earnings prospects, the ability to restore one’s stream
of earnings as quickly as possible is of primary importance to the unemployed, who
presumably have little or no income during the interim. Additionally, a growing
literature has found that unemployment duration has harmful effects on earnings
in the long-term as well as the short-term, further underscoring the incentives for
shortening unemployment (Gregory and Jukes, 2001; Knight and Li, 2006; Cooper,
2014).
Migration as a means of job search has typically been modeled as a two-stage
process as originally proposed by Sjaastad (1962). In the first stage, the unemployed
individual must weigh the expected net present discounted value of moving versus
staying, and chooses whichever yields the highest utility. The binary migration
outcome Mi is thus expressed as:
Mi = αZi + ε (3.1)
where Zi represents all the variables that may influence the migration decision,
including individual and household characteristics, as well as local and national
economic conditions. The second stage expresses the realization of the employment
outcome Ei, which in our case is the occurence of re-employment within a certain
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time frame:
Ei = βMi + δXi + ui (3.2)
where Xi is another set of individual-level and economic variables, potentially over-
lapping with Zi, that affect the probability of re-employment.
As other previous studies have pointed out, one cannot simply estimate this
system of equations via ordinary least squares (OLS), with bias arising due to the
endogenous selection into migration (Bailey, 1991; Goss and White, 1994). In other
words, migration cannot be considered to be a randomly allocated “treatment”, be-
cause individuals choose whether to move based on factors related to their expected
employment prospects in the different locations. If some of these factors are unob-
servable, ignoring these would result in a correlation between ui and Mi, creating a
biased estimates of β (and potentially δ). This bias could operate in either direction.
For example, if the individuals who migrate tend to be those who have strong unob-
servable skills that increase their employment probablity, then uncorrected estimates
will be upwardly biased, making migration appear more beneficial for employment
outcomes than it truly is. Conversely, if movers are the most disadvantaged workers
who have the poorest re-employment prospects generally (conditional on observ-
ables), then such estimates will consequently be biased downward. (Nakosteen et
al., 1980; Herzog et al., 1993).
Many empirical methods exist to correct for such selection bias, the most
commonly used being based on instrumental variables in a linear probability model,
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as described in Angrist (2001). If an instrument can be found that is both in-
dependent of ui and not directly related to Ei conditional on Xi, then β can be
estimated consistently in the two-stage-least-squares (2SLS) framework. Similar to
2SLS are various treatment effect models, which adapt the well-known Heckman
(1979) correction to handle endogeneity on the explanatory variable rather than on
the dependent variable (Maddala, 1999). Recently the use of such models has been
called into question, as their non-linear nature makes them particularly sensitive to
the assumptions of normality and heterskedasticity (Deaton, 1997; Angrist, 2001).
Control function-based models are also employed, such as the two-stage Probit re-
gression, although this have been shown to be inconsistent in the case of binary
endogenous regressors. Hazard models adapted for endogenous regressors also exist,
but are seldom used due to their computational intensity. Thus, while the emphasis
in this study will be on results from a two-stage least squares linear probability
model, other specifications will be explored for robustness.
The instrument for migration that I employ is a measure of the change in local
house prices that the individual has experienced since living in their home. Home
prices have long been seen as an important factor in the migration decision, with
many studies examining the relationship between house prices and flows of migrants
at the aggregate level. This literature has highlighted the role of regional house
prices as a marker of the relative cost of living between different cities, as well as a
reflection of the value of amenities in those locations. (Graves, 1983, Evans, 1990;
Gabriel et. al., 1992, Mueser and Graves, 1995; Bitter, 2008). Experiencing house
price movements during one’s tenure is therefore likely to have a strong impact on
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the decision to migrate for these reasons. Such a change in prices directly influences
the affordability of remaining in one’s home area compared to moving elsewhere.
Additionally, these movements in local house prices reflect changes in the desirability
of an individual’s neighborhood, due to changing amenities and other environmental
factors. Finally, house price movements affect the amount of equity that homeowners
have in their homes, which has been shown to have an impact on one’s ability to
move, as explored in Chapter 2. Note that besides the equity effect, most of the
influences of home prices on migration listed here are relevant to renters as well as
home owners. In fact, some channels may be felt even more strongly by renters. For
example, the affordability of an area is more directly tied to home prices for renters,
whose rent is variable, compared to homeowners who likely have fixed monthly
housing costs. For the sake of tractability, however, the house price variable will be
assumed to have a common effect on both owners and renters.
This house price instrument is presumed to be valid because while house prices
affect the propensity to move, as discussed above, they should be uncorrelated with
employability in general once individual characteristics and other labor market re-
lated controls are included. This identification strategy is similar to that of Pekkala
and Tervo (2002) in their study using adminstrative data on the Finnish workforce.
Unlike in that study, however, I choose not to use homeownership itself as an instru-
ment for migration, because the decision to purchase a home in a given area could
be related to one’s unobservable abilities to find employment in that area relative to
elsewhere. House-price changes are more plausibly exogenous since they are outside
of the individual’s control.
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To construct this instrument, I define a variable expressing the change in house
prices that an individual has experienced since moving into their home, in the same
way as described in Chapter 1. Specifically, I define the variable
∆ln(HPIit) = ln(HPIzjt/HPIz0t ) (3.3)
where t is the reference time period, t0 is the time period when the individual
moved into their home according to the ACS, and HPI represents Zillow’s house
price index for the individual’s zip-code of residence z (within CBSA j) during the
corresponding points in time 5. Note that whereas in Chapter 2 this interaction
term was the key independent variable of interest, in the current analysis it will be
used as an instrumental variable for the propensity to migrate.
Using this instrument based on individual-level house price changes, I will
estimate the causal impact of moving for new employment on the probablity of re-
employment within a given time-frame. Note that this approach takes the initial
unemployed status of the individuals as given, and does not consider how the in-
dividuals arrived at that state in the given place and time. Some have suggested,
such as Vijverberg (1995), that this potentially creates bias if individuals select into
unemployment in a way that is related to one’s job prospects in a given location.
Due to data limitations, I am unable to tell much about the circumstances of the
individual’s unemployment. However, because of our sample restriction that the
individuals have no LEHD earnings during the calendar quarter, and because the
5For more information on the Zillow data and the construction of the change in house price
variable, see Chapter 2.
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ACS definition of unemployment requires that the individual be “actively seeking
work”, it is reasonable to assume that we observe a fairly homogeneous sample of
the involuntary unemployed, rather than some sort of “strategic” unemployment.
3.3.1 Regression Model
We now turn to the regression specifications designed to estimate the impact
of migration on the propensity to become re-employed within a given time frame.
The outcome of interest is the achievement of new employment within a particular
threshold. Thus, the dependent variable is denoted as emp within 1q, an indica-
tor for whether the respondent is re-employed within 1 quarter of the observed
date of unemployment t in the ACS. I will also use re-employment within 2 quar-
ters (emp within 2q), 4 quarters (emp within 4q), and the total number of quar-
ters before the termination of the unemployment spell (unemp duration (qtrs.)),
as alternative left-hand-side variables. The independent variable of interest in all
specifications is Mover, an indicator for whether the worker is observed becom-
ing re-employed in a CBSA −j other than the CBSA j where they were originally
observed residing in the ACS.
Key controls will include personal and household characteristics that are known
to influence the migration decision (Greenwood, 1997). For instance, age has been
found to be a strong determinant of migration, with older workers less likely to be
observed relocating (Sjastaad, 1962). Household factors such as marital status, pres-
ence of children in the household, and homeownership, have also been discovered to
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lower the probability of moving (Sandell, 1977; Mincer, 1978; Graves and Linneman,
1979). Human capital-related factors such as education are likewise important, with
empirical evidence showing that higher-educated workers tend to be more mobile
(Basker, 2003; Wozniak, 2010). The analysis will therefore include measures of age,
sex, race, education, marital status, presence of children, and homeownership, all
of which are provided on the ACS. No earnings variable will be included since by
definition these individuals are not presently employed.
Another individual-level control that I include is the number of years that
a person has lived in their current home, represented by a slate of yearly dummy
variables. This will allow the effects of housing tenure length on migration to vary
in a non-parametric fashion. This control is especially important since the length
of tenure is one of the sources of variation in the house price variable, and thus it
serves to prevent the influences of the house price variable from being conflated with
the influences of housing tenure length.
Local labor market conditions and other economic factors will be accounted
for through other right-hand-side controls. Yearly dummies will account for national
shocks, such as recessions, which will naturally impact national migration propensi-
ties and re-employment rates simultaneously. Dummies for each of the 356 CBSAs
are also included to control for the mean levels of out-migration and re-employment
at the local level. As discussed in the previous chapter, the LEHD coverage expanded
during the sample period, therefore the probability of observing an individual mov-
ing will consequently vary across time and geographic location. However, the year
and CBSA dummies should help account for the fact that the average propensity
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to be detected in a new location will differ by year and CBSA. While the sample
of unemployed is not large enough to accommodate the inclusion of CBSA X time
controls, as was done when using the entire sample of the ACS workforce in the
previous chapter, I will attempt to control for time-varying, location-specific shocks
by including the unemployment rate in the individual’s home CBSA j according to
BLS’s Local Area Unemployment statistics.
The outcome equation can thus be expressed as:
Emp Within kit = β
′Moverit + δ
′Xit + urjt + φj + γt + uit (3.4)
where Xit are the individual and household-level controls, urjt is the unemployment
rate in the reference CBSA and time period, and φj and γt are the CBSA and year
dummies respectively. This specification can be estimated via OLS, which will pro-
duce biased estimates as discussed above, but will serve as a baseline against which
to compare our selection-adjusted results. To adress the endogeneity, I estimate the
following first-stage equation for migration:
Moverit = α
′Zit + urjt + φj + γt + εit (3.5)
where Zit is the instrument set which includes all the variables in Xit, in addition
to the excluded instrument ∆ln(HPI). In the two-stage least squares estimation,
the predicted values from the first stage M̂overit are substituted for Moverit in
equation 3.4, which can then be solved to obtain unbiased estimates of β. Results
102
are consistent provided that the identifying assumptions of Cov(Mover, Z) 6= 0, and
Cov(Z, ε) = 0, hold true. All standard errors are clustered by CBSA, in order to
obtain estimates that are robust to broad patterns of error correlation within labor
markets.
3.4 Results
For the analysis, the sample must be limited to completed unemployment
spells, since I am only able to identify workers as either movers or stayers if and
when they become re-employed. As mentioned above, this means that the analysis
measures the impact of moving on the time to re-employment conditional on even-
tual re-employment. After removing individuals who never receive LEHD earnings
subsequent to observed unemployment, the sample size is reduced by roughly one
third to approximately 152,000. Summary statistics for the final sample of com-
pleted unemployment spells are shown in Table 3.3. We now see that conditional on
re-employment, about one quarter of re-employed workers are observed employed in
another CBSA, while three-quarters remain in their original home CBSA. Approxi-
mately 29% of individuals are re-emloyed within 1 quarter, 46% within 2 quarters,
and 65% within 4 quarters.
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Table 3.3: Regression Sample: Summary Stats
Variable Mean Std. Dev.
Mover 0.244 0.429
Stayer 0.756 0.429
Age25− 34 0.298 0.458
Age35− 44 0.337 0.473
Age45− 54 0.365 0.481
Female 0.549 0.498
Non− white 0.287 0.452








Emp within 1q 0.293 0.455
Emp within 2q 0.457 0.498
Emp within 4q 0.652 0.476
Unemp duration(qtrs.) 4.837 5.388
Sample Size:˜152,000
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3.4.1 Results From Linear Models
Baseline results from the linear specifications are shown in Table 3.4. Column
1 displays results from the OLS specification. The coefficient on mover reveals a
1-quarter re-employment rate for those who migrate that is roughly 5 percentage
points lower than for those who stay. This slightly negative impact of moving is
consistent with previous findings in the literature, such as Shumway (1993), Bailey
(1994), and Pekkala and Tervo (2002). However, the IV results in Column 2 reveal
strongly positive and significant effects of moving on 1-quarter re-employment, with
a coefficient of 0.585. These IV results stand in contrast to those of Pekkala and
Tervo (2002) who employ a similar IV specification and find even stronger negative
effects than in their OLS estimates.
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Table 3.4: Regressions: New LEHD Employment Within 1 quarter




Own .010* ** .033***
(0.003) (.007)
Age35− 44 -.020*** -.017***
(.003) (.004)


















CBSA and Y earFE yes yes
N ˜152,000 ˜152,000
* p ≤ 0.05, ** p ≤ 0.01, *** p ≤ 0.001
Notes: Sample consists of approximately 152,000 completed unemployment spells by ACS re-
spondents i, age 25-54 and residing in one of 356 CBSAs j during 2002-2012. Column 1 reports
estimates from an OLS model, and Column 2 shows results from a 2-step Instrumental Variables
regression. All regressions include dummy variables for the reference CBSA and year of unemploy-
ment. Individual controls for sex, age, race, education, marital status, presence of children, and
residential tenure length are also included. All standard errors are clustered by CBSA.
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Note that aside from the mover variable, the coefficients on the other vari-
ables do not differ significantly between the OLS and 2SLS specifications, with vir-
tually none reversing sign. Homeowners, younger workers, married people, and the
higher educated have higher re-employment propensities, while minorities, females,
and households with children have somewhat lower re-employment propensities.
Higher unemployment rates in one’s home location are also associated with lower
re-employment propensities.
Table 3.5 contains results from the first stage regression, revealing a coefficient
of -0.038 on the excluded house-price instrument ∆HousePrice that is strongly
significant and lies within the unit interval. This expresses the influence of home
prices that is common to both owners and renters, and implies that home price
appreciation is generally associated with less out-migration. This suggests that the
rising amenity values that are reflected in higher prices provide a strong incentive
to staying put, a phenomenon that Pekkala and Tervo (2002) also observe in their
data.
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CBSA and Y earFE yes
N ˜152,000
* p ≤ 0.05, ** p ≤ 0.01, *** p ≤ 0.001
Adjusted Partial Robust
R-sq. R-sq. R-sq. F(3,232) Prob > F
0.0806 0.0784 0.0006 36.0622 0.0000
Notes: Table reports results from the first stage regression of the Z instruments on migration.
All right-hand-side variables from the second stage regression reported in the previous table are
included, in addition to the excluded instrument ∆ln(HPI).
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Note also that homeownership itself, aside from the influence of prices, has a
strong negative effect on out-migration. Recall that homeownership is an indepen-
dent variable and not an excluded instrument because it is presumed to potentially
be directly related to re-employability. Finally, we see that the F-statistic from the
first-stage of the IV regressions is 72, alleviating concerns of weak-instrument bias
according to the criteria put forth by Staiger and Stock (1997).
Other coefficients in the first-stage regression are also consistent with the pre-
vious literature on the determinants of migration. For example, we see that the
older age groups are associated with lower mobility, compared to the excluded 25-34
group (although the results are not significant). Females, minorites, and house-
holds with children are also less likely to relocate. The education categories exhibit
the strongest relationship to migration, however, with the coefficient on College+
suggesting an increased migration propensity of over 3 percentage points. This cor-
responds to the findings of Malamud and Wozniak (2012), which showed a large
impact of post-secondary education on migration propensities.
Table 3.6 shows the results using alternate dependent variables, representing
re-employment in 2 quarters, re-employment in 4 quarters, and the total length of
the completed unemployment spell (in quarters). All three specifications reveal the
same pattern, with OLS estimates suggesting that moving for employment results
in poorer re-employment rates and longer unemployment durations, while IV results
imply that moving has beneficial effects on outcomes. Only the coefficient in the
Emp within 2q specification is significant at the 1% level, however, with the other
two coefficients significant at the 5% level.
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Table 3.6: Regressions with Alternate Dependent Variables
Dependent Variable 1: OLS – Coeff. on Mover 2: IV – Coeff. on Mover
β/(s.e.) β/(s.e.)
Emp within 2q -.062*** 0.780***
(.005) (.183)
Emp within 4q -.063*** .567**
(.006) (.240)
Unemp duration (qtrs.) .763*** -12.081*
(.094) (5.985)
CBSA and Y earFE yes yes
N ˜152,000 ˜152,000
* p ≤ 0.05, ** p ≤ 0.01, *** p ≤ 0.001
Notes: Sample consists of approximately 152,000 completed unemployment spells by ACS re-
spondents i, age 25-54 and residing in one of 356 CBSAs j during 2002-2012. Column 1 reports
estimates from an OLS model, and Column 2 shows results from a 2-step Instrumental Variables
regression. All regressions include dummy variables for the reference CBSA and year of unemploy-
ment. Individual controls for sex, age, race, education, marital status, presence of children, and
residential tenure length are also included. All standard errors are clustered by CBSA.
While these findings are clear in suggesting that migrating for employment
results in a sharp reduction in unemployment duration, there are reasons to suspect
that these results may not be universally generalizable given the large magnitude
of the coefficients. For instance, note that the IV estimates imply that a mover
improves her 1-quarter employment probability by 62% and shortens her unem-
ployment spell by 12 quarters. According to the “local average treatment effect”
interpretation of IV results as discussed in Angrist and Imbens (1995), these esti-
mates are identified off of individuals for whom the moving decision is determined at
the margin by the change in their home price. Whether these people are represen-
tative of the general population is unknown. In addition, the fact that the sample is
composed of the longer-term unemployed gives further reason to believe that these
results may not apply to the unemployed population as a whole.
Note also that because we are considering the impact of moving conditional
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on re-employment, the estimates apply to a particular subset of unemployment
spells and are therefore not directly measuring how moving affects re-employment
in general. Further work using data on residential location, in combination with
employment outcomes, would be needed to test the treatment efect of moving. Nev-
ertheless, these IV results suggest that a subset of unemployed workers who migrate
and obtain employment are doing so in a way that is consistent with the incen-
tive to shorten their unemployment spell. The discrepancy with the OLS results
suggests that such movers possess unobservable qualities that make them less well-
suited to finding employment in their original location. This provides novel evidence
that individuals with poor employment prospects in a given location are properly
incentivized to go elsewhere for employment, in accordance with theory.
3.4.1.1 Comparison to Previous Findings
It is worth considering the large contrast between the results from the IV
regressions that we see here and those of Pekkala and Tervo (2002), who employed
a similar IV strategy using Finnish administrative data. As mentioned, their IV
results showed even more strongly negative effects than in their corresponding OLS
specifications. Contrary to my conclusion, the implication of their findings was that
migrators are, in fact, the best suited to finding re-employment generally, and were
actually extending their time to re-employment by moving.
Besides the obviously different samples in terms of populations and time
frames, there are a couple notable differences between these two studies. First
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of all, Pekkala and Tervo (2002) use regional house prices as an instrument, while
I construct an individual-level house price change based on sub-metropolitan level
data. Secondly, the Finnish study is able to measure residential mobility, lending
itself to to a somewhat different interpretation than my analysis, as discussed above.
Finally, and perhaps most importantly, Pekkala and Tervo chose to use homeown-
ership itself as an excluded instrument, whereas I do not. I make this decision
based on the assumption that the home ownership decision could well be related
to unobservable factors that influence employability, in particular, employability in
one’s home location relative to other areas. In other words, people may choose to
buy a house based on their private information and preferences that make them
especially well-suited to finding employment in that area. In this case, omitting
homeownership from X and including it in Z would violate the exclusion restriction
Cov(Z, ε) = 0, because homeownership’s direct impact on employability would then
be captured in ε. As the IV estimates are identified off the marginal mover who
relocates because they are a renter, comparing their employment outcomes to those
of a similar homeowner who stayed in their home location leads to biased results,
since the homeowner actually possesed an unobserved advantage in employability.
Table 3.7 explores whether this difference in the instrument set is the cause
of the discrepancies between the results in our two analyses. Column 1 shows the
already reported coefficients on mover from the 2SLS specifications for the various
dependent variables, while Column 2 repeats the analysis with the inclusion of home
ownership as an additional excluded instrument.
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Table 3.7: IV Regressions with Alternate Instrument Sets
Dependent Variable 1: Original Instruments 2: Add Owner Instrument
Coeff. on Mover Coeff. on Mover
β/(s.e.) β/(s.e.)
Emp within 1q 0.620*** -.058
(.191) (.096)
Emp within 2q 0.780*** -.003
(.183) (.108)
Emp within 4q .567** .003
(.240) (.117)
Unemp duration (qtrs.) -12.081* -3.118
(5.985) (2.289)
CBSA and Y earFE yes yes
N ˜152,000 ˜152,000
* p ≤ 0.05, ** p ≤ 0.01, *** p ≤ 0.001
Notes: Sample consists of approximately 152,000 completed unemployment spells by ACS re-
spondents i, age 25-54 and residing in one of 356 CBSAs j during 2002-2012. Column 1 reports
estimates from an OLS model, and Column 2 shows results from a 2-step Instrumental Variables
regression. All regressions include dummy variables for the reference CBSA and year of unemploy-
ment. Individual controls for sex, age, race, education, marital status, presence of children, and
residential tenure length are also included. All standard errors are clustered by CBSA.
We see that the results from the two specifications are indeed markedly differ-
ent. The inclusion of home ownership as an instrument pushes the point estimates
of the Mover coefficients back toward zero, reversing the sign in 3 out of the 4 cases.
None of the coefficients are significant, however, and none are farther from zero than
their corresponding OLS estimates. Thus, we still do not see evidence that the OLS
estimates are upwardly biased, as Pekkala and Tervo (2002) found. Given the im-
precision of the results, it is difficult to come to any definitive conclusions, but it
appears likely that the decision whether to use homeownership as an instrument is
partly contributing to the large gap between the results from the two analyses.
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3.4.2 Results from Probit models
As robustness tests for the baseline results, I explore other, non-linear, spec-
ifications. First we explore a Probit model, which are designed to handle binary
outcomes such as our re-employment variables. However, note that the 2-stage pro-
bit model that is most analogous to the setup of two-stage-least-squares is not tech-
nically appropriate for use with binary endogenous regressors (Wooldridge, 2010) .
Thus, this example will serve illustrative purposes only.
The two-step Probit model can be applied to equations (4) and (5) above, by
adding the following further assumption:
(uit, εit) ∼ N(0, Σ) (3.6)
where σ11 is normalized to equal 1 for purposes of identification. This can then be
estimated via the two-step method described in Newey (1987).
Table 3.8 shows the results of a standard Probit regression on equation (4)
in the left-hand column, and of the two-stage Probit with instrumental variables
in the right-hand column. The unadjusted estimates in Column 1 show a negative
impact of migration on re-employment, while the 2-stage IV Probit results show
strong positive effects – mirroring the pattern seen in the results from the linear
specifications. Using the 2-quarter or the 4-quarter thresholds yields similar qual-
itative results. (Note that time-to-remployment is not a binary outcome and thus
cannot be estimated via Probit.)
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Table 3.8: Probit Specification
Dependent Variable 1: Probit 2: IV Probit
Marg. Effect of Mover Marg. Effect of Mover
β/(s.e.) β/(s.e.)
Emp within 1q -.050*** 1.43***
(.004) (.279)
Emp within 2q -.064*** 1.508***
(.005) (.212)
Emp within 4q -.064*** 1.252***
(.006) (.372)
CBSA and Y earFE yes yes
N ˜152,000 ˜152,000
* p ≤ 0.05, ** p ≤ 0.01, *** p ≤ 0.001
Notes: Sample consists of approximately 152,000 completed unemployment spells by ACS respon-
dents i, age 25-54 and residing in one of 356 CBSAs j during 2002-2012. Column 1 reports estimates
from a Probit model, and Column 2 shows results from a 2-step IV Probit. All regressions include
dummy variables for the reference CBSA and year of unemployment. Individual controls for sex,
age, race, education, marital status, presence of children, and residential tenure length are also
included. All standard errors are clustered by CBSA.
3.4.3 Results from Hazard models
Unemployment spells are known to exhibit duration dependence and have
thus been commonly studied in a hazard or survival framework since Meyer (1990,
1991). Such models systematically account for the baseline hazard, or the natural
propensity to escape unemployment at a certain point in time, given the survival
of the unemployment spell up to that point. Unfortunately, there are few hazard
models built to handle endogenous regressors, and those that are available require
restrictive assumptions and are computationally onerous.
To explore this avenue, however, I will follow the method created by Bjiwaard
and Ridder (2005), a linear rank estimator based on a mixed proportional hazard
model with a piecewise linear baseline hazard. This model accomodates the use
of instruments for the endogenous covariate, although only one instrument is per-
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mitted. As a consequence, I choose to include only the ∆HousePrice variable and
omit its interaction with home ownership. Estimation requires intensive numerical
maximization, via Newton-Raphson and Powell methods, thus I run the model on
a random sample of only 3,000 observations, and omit the year and CBSA fixed
effects.
Table 3.9 shows the results from the hazard analysis where the dependent
variable is emp within 1qtr. To provide a baseline for comparison, Column 1 shows
the results from a unadjusted hazard regression, with a parametric baseline haz-
ard defined by the exponential distribution. Coefficients are translated to express
marginal efects at the average values of covariates. The coefficent on mover in the
exponential model is -.085, implying that migration reduces the propensity to es-
cape unemployment. The results of the Bijwaard and Ridder estimator in Column
2, however, show that the sign of the mover coefficient has reversed, with a coef-
ficient of .185 that is significant at the .1% level, once again expressing a positive
influence of migration on re-employment. The signs on the coefficients of the other
covariates do not change between the two specifications, and are largely consistent
with the linear 2SLS results. One exception is the estimated impact of the local un-
employment rate, shown here to be positively correlated with re-employment, but
this could potentially be due to the omission of the year and CBSA controls which
were present in the earlier tests.
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Table 3.9: Hazard Specification






Age35− 44 .011 .017***
(.046) (.001)


















CBSA and Y earFE yes yes
N ˜3,000 ˜3,000
* p ≤ 0.05, ** p ≤ 0.01, *** p ≤ 0.001
Notes: Sample consists of 3,000 completed unemployment spells by ACS respondents i, age 25-
54 and residing in one of 356 CBSAs j during 2002-2012. Column 1 reports estimates from
an exponential hazard model, and Column 2 shows results from a mixed proportional hazard IV
model. All regressions include dummy variables for the reference CBSA and year of unemployment.
Individual controls for sex, age, race, education, marital status, presence of children, and residential
tenure length are also included. All standard errors are clustered by CBSA.
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3.5 Conclusion
This study combines information from the ACS and the LEHD database to
measure unemployment duration and out-migration in a sample of the unemployed.
The focus of the analysis was to test how migrators fare in terms of their time to
re-employment compared to how they would have done had they reamained in their
original location. By controlling for selection into migration with an instrumental
variable strategy based on local house price changes, I find that movers have a
significantly higher probability of re-employment within a given time threshhold,
and shorter unemployment spells. This pattern is seen in estimates from a 2SLS
linear probability model, as well as in non-linear specifications such as Probit and
hazard models. While these findings stand in contrast to some of the previous
literature, we note that these results will naturally be sensitive to different choices
in instruments. Here I argued that instruments based on individual house-price
changes are a parsimonious and plausibly exogenous instrument for migration, but
future work in finding other instruments or exogenous variation in migration would
be valuable for assessing these issues further.
Ultimately, it should perhaps not be surprising that migration appears to
improve the outcomes of the unemployed. Relocating is a costly endeavor in terms
of money and time, which the jobless can often ill-afford. Leaving one’s home area
may also represent a loss of location-specific capital in the labor market. Therefore,
in order to provide sufficient incentive to undertake a long-distance move, the benefit
from doing so must be large enough to outweigh the potentially substantial costs.
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It stands to reason that this is most likely to hold true for those who are struggling
greatly to find employment, as they likely have the most to gain by moving compared
to their already diminished prospects at home. Indeed, the stark contrast between
the OLS and IV estimates appears to support this interpretation.
While this study looks at one specific outcome, namely the time to re-employment,
these short-term considerations are not the only ones that the unemployed face in
their locational decision. Studies such as Kennan and Walker (2010) have addressed
the importance of lifetime earnings expectations in the migration decision, although
their study does not explicitly address the unemployed. Thus, further study is war-
ranted to determine whether the unemployed in particular appear to be motivated
by these longer-term income and career prospects. After all, different priorities may
guide the migration decision for the unemployed than for the population at large,
but the results in the present analysis suggest that shortening their unemployment
spells appears to be a key consideration.
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Appendix A: Regression Results for Demographic Subsamples
Table A.1: Results by Sex
(1) (2) (3) (4)
House Price measure Neg equity Neg equity ∆ln(HPI) ∆ln(HPI)
Subsample Female Male Female Male
β/(s.e.) β/(s.e.) β/(s.e.) β/(s.e.)
HousePriceXOwn -0.001 -0.003*** 0.005*** 0.006***
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Own -0.000 0.009* -0.002 -0.011*
(0.003) (0.004) (0.003) (0.004)
HousePrice -0.001 0.001 -0.002* -0.002**
(0.000) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
N ˜3,900,000 ˜3,400,000 ˜3,900,000 ˜3,400,000
* p ≤ 0.05, ** p ≤ 0.01, *** p ≤ 0.001
Notes: Sample consists of approximately 7.3 million ACS individuals i, either household
head or spouse age 25-54, who are observed in one of 356 CBSAs j during a given quarter t
in 2002q1-2012q4. All regressions include the following sets of controls: Ownership status
X CBSA, CBSA X time period, Ownership status X time period. Individual controls
for sex, age, race, education, marital status, presence of children, and residential tenure
length are also included. Standard errors are clustered by CBSA.
120
Table A.2: Results by Race
(1) (2) (3) (4)
House Price measure Neg equity Neg equity ∆ln(HPI) ∆ln(HPI)
Subsample Nonwhite White Nonwhite White
β/(s.e.) β/(s.e.) β/(s.e.) β/(s.e.)
HousePriceXOwn -0.002* -0.0021*** 0.005*** 0.006***
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Own -0.005 -0.004 -0.007 -0.006*
(0.005) (0.003) (0.005) (0.003)
HousePrice 0.000 0.001 -0.002 -0.003**
(0.001) (0.0001) (0.001) (0.001)
N ˜1,500,000 ˜5,800,000 ˜1,500,000 ˜5,800,000
* p ≤ 0.05, ** p ≤ 0.01, *** p ≤ 0.001
Notes: Sample consists of approximately 7.3 million ACS individuals i, either household head or
spouse age 25-54, who are observed in one of 356 CBSAs j during a given quarter t in 2002q1-
2012q4. All regressions include the following sets of controls: Ownership status X CBSA, CBSA
X time period, Ownership status X time period. Individual controls for sex, age, race, education,
marital status, presence of children, and residential tenure length are also included. Standard
errors are clustered by CBSA.
Table A.3: Results by Age Group
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
House Price measure Neg equity Neg equity Neg equity ∆ln(HPI) ∆ln(HPI) ∆ln(HPI)
Subsample 25-34 35-44 45-54 25-34 35-44 45-54
β/(s.e.) β/(s.e.) β/(s.e.) β/(s.e.) β/(s.e.) β/(s.e.)
HousePriceXOwn -0.002* -0.002* -0.001 0.008*** 0.003** 0.002
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.002)
Own -0.010* -0.002 0.001 -0.012** -0.003 0.006
(0.004) (0.004) (0.003) (0.004) (0.004) (0.000)
HousePrice 0.001 0.001 0.000 -0.003* -0.001 -0.000
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.000)
N ˜2,000,000 ˜2,500,000 ˜2,800,000 ˜2,000,000 ˜2,500,000 ˜2,800,000
* p ≤ 0.05, ** p ≤ 0.01, *** p ≤ 0.001
Notes: Sample consists of approximately 7.3 million ACS individuals i, either household head or
spouse age 25-54, who are observed in one of 356 CBSAs j during a given quarter t in 2002q1-
2012q4. All regressions include the following sets of controls: Ownership status X CBSA, CBSA
X time period, Ownership status X time period. Individual controls for sex, age, race, education,
marital status, presence of children, and residential tenure length are also included. Standard


































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Table A.5: Results by Marital Status
(1) (2) (3) (4)
House Price measure Neg equity Neg equity ∆ln(HPI) ∆ln(HPI)
Subsample Married Unmarried Married Unmarried
β/(s.e.) β/(s.e.) β/(s.e.) β/(s.e.)
HousePriceXOwn -0.003** -0.002** 0.005*** 0.006***
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Own -0.007 -0.001 -0.009* -0.003
(0.004) (0.003) (0.004) (0.003)
HousePrice 0.001 0.001 -0.003* -0.002*
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
N ˜5,300,000 ˜2,000,000 ˜5,300,000 ˜2,000,000
* p ≤ 0.05, ** p ≤ 0.01, *** p ≤ 0.001
Notes: Sample consists of approximately 7.3 million ACS individuals i, either household head or
spouse age 25-54, who are observed in one of 356 CBSAs j during a given quarter t in 2002q1-
2012q4. All regressions include the following sets of controls: Ownership status X CBSA, CBSA
X time period, Ownership status X time period. Individual controls for sex, age, race, education,
marital status, presence of children, and residential tenure length are also included. Standard
errors are clustered by CBSA.
Table A.6: Results by Presence of Children
(1) (2) (3) (4)
House Price measure Neg equity Neg equity ∆ln(HPI) ∆ln(HPI)
Subsample Children No Children Children No Children
β/(s.e.) β/(s.e.) β/(s.e.) β/(s.e.)
HousePriceXOwn -0.001* -0.003*** 0.003** 0.007***
(0.000) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Own -0.004 -0.005 -0.005** -0.008***
(0.004) (0.003) (0.004) (0.003)
HousePrice 0.000 0.001 -0.001 -0.003*
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
N ˜4,300,000 ˜3,300,000 ˜4,300,000 ˜3,300,000
* p ≤ 0.05, ** p ≤ 0.01, *** p ≤ 0.001
Notes: Sample consists of approximately 7.3 million ACS individuals i, either household head or
spouse age 25-54, who are observed in one of 356 CBSAs j during a given quarter t in 2002q1-
2012q4. All regressions include the following sets of controls: Ownership status X CBSA, CBSA
X time period, Ownership status X time period. Individual controls for sex, age, race, education,
marital status, presence of children, and residential tenure length are also included. Standard
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